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INTRODUCTION
T HE term "family values" evokes strong reactions. During the 1992
Presidential campaign, controversy surrounding family values gener-
ated memorable moments. These included Vice President Quayle's at-
tack on television character Murphy Brown's decision to become a single
parent' and the nationally televised speeches of Patrick Buchanan and
Pat Robertson at the Republican National Convention attacking the
Democrats as enemies of the family.' Even after the campaign, family
1. See Vice President Quayle challenged Murphy Brown for "mocking the impor-
tance of fathers, by bearing a child alone, and calling it just another 'life style choice.'"
Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from Lack of Family Values, N.Y. Times,
May 20, 1992, at Al, A20. He also attributed recent urban riots to the "breakdown" of
family values. Id.; see also Orrin G. Hatch, A Dependence on the People, 77 Cornell L.
Rev. 959, 962 (1992) ("The leading social problem in this country today is the breakdown
of the American family."); Thomas B. Edsall, Clinton Steps Up Economic Attacks, Wash.
Post, Sept. 21, 1992, at A10 (candidate Bill Clinton asserts Bush policy "talks about
family values, but doesn't value working families"); Robin Toner, As Simple as Life Itself,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1992, at Al ("Republican Party has staked out 'family values' as a
principal theme this year").
2. See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., The Economy's Casualty, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1992, at
Al, B3 (suggesting that "[w]omen in particular were offended" by convention speeches of
1254 [Vol. 62
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values issues continue to play a significant political role.'
Less well known to the public, but also the subject of emotionally
charged rhetoric, is the debate within the legal profession regarding the
place of family values in legal ethics. This debate occurs in the context of
determining the proper ethical boundaries of representing family mem-
bers, an effort which necessarily implicates definitions of the family.
While this Article will focus primarily on conflicts of interest issues that
arise during the representation of spouses, its analysis and conclusions
will also apply more broadly to the representation of families.4
The larger debate concerning how to represent families ethically is not
new. Opponents of the nomination of Louis Dembitz Brandeis to the
United States Supreme Court accused him of improperly representing
the conflicting business interests of family members.' During the 1916
Pat Robertson and Patrick Buchanan asserting that those who disagreed with their per-
spective on family values "were somehow not fully American"); William Saire, Family
Values, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (quoting Pat Robertson's speech
to Republican Convention as asserting that "'Bill and Hillary Clinton .... are talking
about a radical plan to destroy the traditional family' "); Robin Toner, Critical Moment"
How Bush Lost Five Chances to Seize the Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1992, § 4, at I ("The
[Republican] convention became known not for its economic prescriptions, but for its
nightly appeals to 'family values,' delivered by such tribunes of the right as Mr.
Buchanan and the Rev. Pat Robertson."); Tom Wicker, The Democrats as the Devil's
Disciples, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1992, § 4, at 3 (describing opponents of the Democratic
party as charging that the party "ha[s] no concept of families.").
3. See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, Religious Right to Flex Muscles, USA Today, Sept.
10, 1993, at 5A (describing Washington, D.C. convention of Christian Coalition activists
who are "drawn to grass-roots politics by what they see as breakdowns in morality and
threats to traditional family values"); Celia W. Dugger, Workers' Partners Added To
Health Plan by Dinkins, N.Y. Times, October 31, 1993, § I, at 40 (on eve of election,
Mayor announces health benefits for domestic partners of homosexual City workers and
states that "if we are really for family values we must then value all families").
4. The approaches discussed in this Article would also apply to representation of
intergenerational families, including single parent families, as well as non-traditional fam-
ilies. See infra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
5. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of MAul-
tiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. I11. L. Rev. 741,753-55 (1992); John
P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 694-98 (1965).
Professor Dzienkowski summarizes this incident as follows:
In 1888, Brandeis represented S.D. Warren and Company, a paper mill corpo-
ration owned by the father of his law partner. When the owner died in 1888,
Brandeis represented the estate and the individual family members in the volun-
tary formation of a trust. The trust received all of the property and subse-
quently leased it to his law partner and another substantial owner of the
business. For the next decade, the Brandeis firm continued to represent the
trustees and the lessees. In 1909, one of the family members brought suit
against the lessees to declare the lease invalid and to obtain an accounting,
partly out of dissatisfaction with the manner in which Brandeis's former law
partner was running the business. Brandeis represented the lessees against the
former client. Eventually, other family members bought out the plaintiff family
members' interests, and the litigation was terminated.
Dzienkowski, supra, at 753-54 (footnotes omitted). At the hearings on Brandeis's nomi-
nation, the charges against him arising from the Warren representation were "'that he
for a long time represented and collected fees from two clients whose interests were dia-
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Senate hearings on this and other allegations of unethical conduct, Bran-
deis and his supporters defended his representation of seemingly conflict-
ing interests on, among other grounds, the basis that he was acting
ethically as "lawyer for the situation," rather than for the particular
individuals.6
In recent years, the issue of how to represent spouses in estate planning
has generated considerable controversy. Professor Thomas L. Shaffer,
one of the leading scholars in the field of professional responsibility, has
labelled established applications of conflicts doctrine to family represen-
tation "corrupting," "false," "irresponsible," and "untruthful."7 Also
challenging the established approach, but in a less confrontational man-
ner, the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law ("Real
Property Section") has recommended guidelines for ethical representa-
tion of spouses.' The Real Property Section's Recommendations, while
on their face claiming to conform to established ethical doctrine, in fact
propose a number of departures from that doctrine. These departures
include an assumption of unitary spousal interests, a narrow view of
when keeping confidences of one spouse from another creates a conflict,
and a broad view of the lawyer's ability to represent simultaneously and
separately two spouses with differing or opposing interests.9 In turn,
Professor Teresa Stanton Collett has criticized the Real Property Sec-
tion's acceptance of separate, simultaneous representation as undermin-
ing the "unity" of the family 1° and unnecessarily "excus[ing] the
disloyalty inherent in the lawyer's actions.""
This Article explores the debate surrounding the ethical representation
metrically opposed to each other and when they, later, went to law over those same
conflicting interests he took employment for one of them against the other.'" Id. at 753
n.64 (quoting 3 The Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings and Reports on Suc-
cessful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 1916-1975, at 298-99 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobson eds., 1977)).
6. Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 748-57; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Prac-
tice of Law 61 (1978).
7. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
963, 982, 987 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Individualism].
8. See ABA Special Probate and Trust Division Study Committee on Professional Re-
sponsibility: Comments and Recommendations on The Lawyer's Duties in Representing
Husband and Wife (approved by the Section on May 2, 1993) [hereinafter Real Property
Section's Recommendations]; Malcolm A. Moore & Anne K. Hilker, Representing Both
Spouses: The New Section Recommendations, 7 Prob. & Prop., July-Aug. 1993, at 26.
9. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8; infra part IV. The
American College of Trusts and Estate Counsel appears to be taking a similar position
with regard to joint and separate representation. See Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., Husband
and Wife Representation Guideline Withdrawn; Project to Continue, 15 Prob. Notes 302
(1990) (draft guideline has been modified "to make the joint representation and separate
representation approaches equally permissible").
10. Teresa S. Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One... Until the Lawyers are
Done, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 101, 142-43 (1993) [hereinafter Collett,
And the Two].
11. Id. at 143.
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of families and proposes changes in legal ethics to serve families better.' 2
Part I of the Article reviews the general application of conflicts doctrine
to spousal representation and the specific application of the doctrine to
two hypotheticals.' 3
In the "Estate Hypothetical," spouses John and Mary meet with and
retain Ms. Lawyer for estate planning. They ask her to prepare mirror
wills for them. The Article suggests that established doctrine permits
Ms. Lawyer to represent John and Mary after consideration of possible
differences, client consent, and Ms. Lawyer's reasonable belief that the
representation or lawyer-client relationship will not be adversely af-
fected.14 Two days after Ms. Lawyer agrees to the representation, Mary
calls Ms. Lawyer and asks her to prepare a different will for Mary and to
keep confidential from John both the terms of Mary's will and Mary's
separate consultation with Ms. Lawyer.'" At this point, if Mary refuses
to agree to disclose this information to John, Ms. Lawyer must withdraw
from representation of both spouses and probably can not disclose
Mary's call to John. 6
In the "Nursing Home Hypothetical," Ozzie and Harriet contact Mr.
Lawyer, a legal services staff attorney, who previously represented them
both in a dispute with their landlord. Harriet has suffered a series of
strokes, cannot take care of herself physically, and has periods of disori-
entation. Ozzie wants to place Harriet in a nursing home. Harriet re-
fuses. Ozzie and Harriet love each other and want to resolve their
differences amicably. They turn to Mr. Lawyer for guidance about their
legal rights and the best way to proceed. If Mr. Lawyer cannot help
them resolve their differences, Ozzie intends to seek legal assistance and
12. See infra part V. A spirited debate exists regarding the definition of family. See.
eg., Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy,
23 Conn. L. Rev. 955, 972 (1991) (suggesting that the definition of family "has undergone
serious revision" as "[n]onmarital heterosexual cohabitation has dramatically increased,
and even same-sex relationships are gaining some acceptance," and urging that the "so-
cial concept of what constitutes a family" be extended to single mother families); Karl
Zinsmeister, Parental Responsibility and the Future of the American Family, 77 Cornell L
Rev. 1005, 1008 (1992) (arguing for policies to promote the traditional "nuclear family"
on the ground that "[n]either substitute families nor pseudo-families nor family supple-
ments are able to do for society what traditional nuclear families have done as a matter of
course for millennia"). See generally Kris Franklin, Note, "A Family Like Any Other
Family:" Alternative Methods of Defining Family in Law, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 1027 (1990-91) (arguing that it is necessary to adapt family law to the changing
definition of "family"). This Article does not propose a definition of the family. In both
the established ethics doctrine, and this Article's alternative approach, the legal ethics
codes need not define who is or is not a family. See infra notes 347-49 and accompanying
text.
13. See infra part I.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 105-22.
15. This hypothetical is loosely based on the famous hypothetical The Case of the
Unwanted Will, 65 A.B.A.J. 484 (1979). For other analyses of this hypothetical, see
Deborah Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 476-483 (1992); Shaffer, Individualism,
supra note 7, at 968-91.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 105-22.
1994] 1257
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Harriet intends to defend herself. 7 For purposes of this hypothetical,
assume that Harriet, while periodically disoriented, is competent at the
time of consultation with Mr. Lawyer.II The Article suggests that estab-
lished doctrine probably requires Mr. Lawyer to refuse to represent Oz-
zie and Harriet.19
In Part II, the Article examines the view of the family underlying es-
tablished doctrine. This part explains how the established doctrine re-
flects the understanding that the family is primarily a collection of
individuals, rather than a family unit.20 Parts III and IV describe chal-
lenges to the established doctrine arising from different perspectives of
the family. Part III examines Professor Shaffer's view, derived from his
understanding of families as organic communities, that established doc-
trine improperly views families as collections of individuals. He suggests
instead that lawyers represent the family as a unit.2 ' Part IV explains the
Real Property Section's Recommendations which, confusingly, are si-
multaneously both more communitarian and more atomistic in their ap-
proach to the family than the established doctrine.22
Part V proposes a new legal ethic for representing families. In addi-
tion to separate, joint, or intermediation representation under established
doctrine, family members could choose Optional Family Representation.
Optional Family Representation would permit representation of family
members as a group even where actual or potential risks to individual
interests would prohibit joint or intermediation representation under es-
tablished doctrine.
Part V.B. examines the reasons for permitting Optimal Family Repre-
sentation, including an appropriate deference to the group's identity and
harmonies, and the individual choices of family members. Part V.C. re-
sponds to the potential challenges to permitting Optional Family Repre-
17. This hypothetical is loosely based on a hypothetical in Patricia M. Batt, Note,
The Family Unit as Client. A Means To Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Elder
Law Attorneys, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 319, 325 (1992). Ms. Batt, in turn, draws this
hypothetical from Exploring Ethical Issues in Meeting the Legal Needs of the Elderly 27
(American Bar Association Marie Walsh Sharpe Legal Awareness of Older Americans
Project 1987).
18. In many health impairments, the individual is neither competent nor incompetent
all the time. Periods of disorientation are episodic. See Robert P. Roca, Determining
Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Cli-
ents, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1177 (1994). For a further discussion of client competence
issues in representing the elderly, which are beyond the scope of this article, see Peter
Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior
Citizens of Questionable Capacity, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1073 (1994); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially
Harmful Choices: What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Con-
struct, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101 (1994);
Roca, supra.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 123-30.
20. See infra part II.
21. See infra part III.
22. See infra part IV.
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sentation by explaining specific provisions of Optional Family
Representation that address the problems these challenges identify.
Under these provisions the family must establish procedures for commu-
nicating with the lawyer and making decisions. The lawyer must deter-
mine that a bona fide family group exists. The lawyer must also provide
each individual family member with relevant counsel and information
necessary for them to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of fam-
ily group representation throughout the representation. Accordingly, the
lawyer must not keep confidential from family members information re-
lating to other individuals or the entity. Last, to avoid the confusion and
perception of disloyalty that could arise from continued representation of
some group members when others withdraw from representation, con-
sent of the withdrawing family members should be necessary to contin-
ued representation of others. Insofar as all of these proposed
modifications are appropriate for all representations of small groups, the
Article proposes modifying either Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") Rule 1.13 or 2.2, rather than providing a separate rule
for family representation.23 With these changes, legal ethics would give
greater respect to families.
I. THE DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE
This Part reviews the established doctrinal perspectives on spousal and
family representation. Part I.A. offers an overview of the conflicts of
interest rules.24 Part I.B. provides an analysis of how these rules would
generally apply to spousal representation. Part I.C. then applies these
rules to two specific hypotheticals. Both the general and specific analyses
of the conflicts rules suggest that they limit lawyers' representation of
spouses. The spouses' potential differences require the lawyer generally
to obtain informed consent to spousal representation. However, consent
alone is not sufficient to permit the lawyer to initiate or continue repre-
sentation. The lawyer must also objectively determine that continued
representation of one spouse will not adversely affect the relationship
with, or representation of, the other. Therefore, in a number of in-
stances, lawyers may not be able to represent both spouses, even with
their consent.
23. See ABA Model Rules Of Professional Conduct Rules 1.13, 2.2 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Model Rules]. Of the fifty States and the District of Columbia, thirty-seven have
adopted the Model Rules. See Laws. Man. On Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:3-1:4
(1994). All but two of the remainder follow the Model Code Of Professional Responsibil-
ity (1980) [hereinafter Model Code], but often with modifications to reflect changes intro-
duced in the Model Rules. See id. The Article will focus on the Model Rules, but will
provide citations to relevant Model Code provisions in footnotes.
24. Although the term "conflict of interest" does not appear in the text of the relevant
rules, see Model Rules Rules 1.7, 1.9; Model Code, supra note 23, Canon 5, it does appear
in the title of the relevant provisions of the Model Rules, see Model Rules Rules 1.7, 1.9;
and in commentaries, see, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 7.1.1 (1986)
(discussing "conflicts of interest" in legal practice).
1994] 1259
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A. Overview of Conflicts Rules
The lawyer's obligation to avoid representation of clients with conflict-
ing interests25 is often derived from the lawyer's duty of loyalty to her
client.2 6 As Professors Hazard and Hodes observe in their treatise, how-
ever, conflicts issues broadly "implicate ... [t]he basic duties a lawyer
owes to a client-competence, confidentiality, communication, and loy-
alty."' 27 The proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers elab-
orates by noting that conflicts undermine a client's "trust" in her
lawyer's "undivided loyalty," impair the lawyer's judgment and dedica-
tion necessary to competent representation, and increase the opportunity
for "use of confidential information against interests of the client."' 28 In
addition, the prohibition of conflicts "protect[s] interests of the legal sys-
tem in obtaining adequate presentation of matters to tribunals. '29
Professors Hazard and Hodes further note that duties of communication
arise from the lawyer's obligation to consult with clients in obtaining
waivers of conflicts.3°
The proposed Restatement acknowledges, however, that because "con-
flict avoidance can impose significant costs on lawyers and clients alike[,
a]ny prohibition of conflicts of interest should reach no farther than nec-
essary."'31 These costs include the multiple clients obtaining separate
25. Professor Monroe Freedman has identified some common confusion in conflicts
terminology. He notes:
an 'actual' conflict of interest... ordinarily mean[s] that the substantive impro-
priety that the conflict of interest rule was designed to prevent has in fact taken
place. Thus, two distinct ideas-the initial conflict of interest and the resultant
breach of zeal or confidentiality-are collapsed into the single phrase, 'actual
conflict of interest.' It would be more accurate to say, therefore, that the lawyer
had been involved in a conflict of interest which then resulted in a breach of
confidentiality.
Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 181 (1992). The use of the phrase
"actual conflict of interest" has led to the use of the "redundant" phrase "potential con-
flict of interest" even though "every conflict of interest is 'potential' in the sense that the
proscription seeks to prevent a substantive ethical violation from occurring." Id. The
phrase "'an appearance of a conflict of interest'" is similarly "redundant" "because...
one thing that 'conflict of interest' connotes is 'an appearance of impropriety.' " Id.; see
also Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 823, 846-47 (1992) (criticizing use of phrases "actual" and "potential" conflicts of
interest). This Article will refer to actual or potential differences, rather than actual or
potential conflicts.
26. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7 cmt.
27. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.1:101
(2d ed. Supp. 1992 & 1993). See Freedman, supra note 25, at 174 ("[Tjhere is no distinct
ethical imperative of loyalty. It can be equated with zeal, or it can serve as a convenient
way of saying confidentiality, zeal, competence, and communication."). But see
McMunigal, supra note 25 (criticizing established conflicts doctrine as an ambiguous mix
of competing risk avoidance, resulting impairment, and appearance approaches).
28. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 201 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 4
1991) [hereinafter Restatement Governing Lawyers].
29. Id.
30. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:101.
31. Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 201 cmt. b.
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representation, interference with client expectations of retaining a partic-
ular lawyer, disclosures or delays necessary to obtain consent to conflicts,
and limits on "lawyers' own freedom to practice according to their own
best judgment of appropriate professional behavior."32
The established conflicts doctrine represents a "balancing of the inter-
ests involved."33 The doctrine does not bar all representation of clients
with conflicting interests. It permits, however, such representation only
with client consent and the lawyer's objective determination that the rep-
resentation of, or relationship with, the clients will not be adversely
affected.
Rule 1.7"' of the Model Rules provides the basic guide for concurrent
representation of clients with conflicting interests, whether the conflicts
developed before or during the representations.3 " Rule 1.7 has two parts.
Rule 1.7(a) applies where representation of one client will be "directly
adverse to another client,"3 6 while Rule 1.7(b) applies where the lawyer's
responsibilities to one client may materially limit representation of
another.
3 7
Under Rule 1.7(a), a lawyer may represent clients directly adverse to
each other only where "each client consents after consultation" and "the
32. Id
33. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:101.
34. The text of the rule is as follows:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely af-
fect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include ex-
planation of the implications of the common representation and the advan-
tages and risks involved.
Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7.
35. The analogous Model Code provisions are DR 5-105 (B) & (C) which provide:
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely
to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105... (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possi-
ble effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each.
Model Code, supra note 23, DR 5-105 (B)-(C).
36. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(a).
37. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b).
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lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client."38 Professors Hazard and Hodes note
that while client consent is "highly relevant in appraising the probable
effect of the representation on the client-lawyer relationships,"39 a law-
yer's reasonable belief that the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship"' will be "relatively rare."'" They suggest that "Rule 1.7(a)
contemplates the practical equivalent of an absolute ban on concurrent
representation of clients whose interests are in direct conflict."42 This
"presumption against concurrent representation of clients with directly
conflicting interests" is especially strong "where one of the clients is an
individual, as opposed to a business or other entity, [because] the client's
personal feelings will almost always be bound up in any legal transaction
to which he or she is a party." 43
While Rule 1.7(a) applies to existing and direct adversity, Rule 1.7(b)
applies even where the lawyer's responsibilities may only indirectly limit
representation.' Rule 1.7(b) governs situations where representation of
a client "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
other client."45 Rule 1.7(b) permits such representation only where "the
client consents after consultation" and "the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected." 46 The Rule further
specifies that the consultation for representing "multiple clients in a sin-
gle matter ... shall include [an] explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved." 7 One
of the risks is that "information received from one joint client about the
subject matter of the joint representation is not privileged from disclosure
against the other client, [even though] it may be a confidence that the
lawyer has a duty not to disclose to the other client."48
38. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(a).
39. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:207.
40. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b).
41. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:207. Professors Hazard and Hodes note
that the omissions of "terms such as 'materially' or 'substantially' . . . suggests that any
impairment of the client-lawyer relationship precludes concurrent representation in situa-
tions of direct client-to-client conflict." Id. Also, Rule 1.7(a) cases "involve the two main
dangers that Rule 1.7 as a whole is designed to avoid." Id. These are:
First, that confidential information will "leak" from one camp to the other;
second, that clients and the public at large will be disturbed by the sight of one
lawyer disloyally "playing both sides of the street," earning two fees, and possi-
bly pulling his punches.
Id.
42. Id. § 1.7:207. Professors Hazard and Hodes note that the provisions of DR 5-
105(C) would lead to similar result. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. § 1.7:300. But see Freedman, supra note 25, at 191 (arguing that Rule
1.7(a) is unnecessary because all the situations it covers are included within Rule 1.7(b)).
45. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b).
46. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
47. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
48. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering
229 (1990) (citing Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.
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Professors Hazard and Hodes note that "Rule 1.7(b) is more flexible
than Rule 1.7(a), for it speaks to material limitations on the representa-
tion[s] [and it] forces a case-specific inquiry into the precise effect that a
particular combination of conflicting responsibilities might engender." '49
At the same time, Rule 1.7(b) is a "strong 'client-protecting' rule [that]
will sometimes require a careful lawyer to decline representation of a
client who very much wants to be represented by that lawyer" on ac-
count of "the long-term public interest in protecting clients against fool-
ish waivers, or against waivers that will reflect poorly on the legal
system."5 Indeed, the requirement of the lawyer's reasonable belief
"may be somewhat more stringent" under Rule 1.7(b) than Rule 1.7(a)
because the client can judge the "quality of the client-lawyer relation-
1979)). Professors Hazard and Koniak's comment indicates that although under the law
of evidence joint clients waive the attorney-client privilege regarding their joint represen-
tation in the event that they later sue each other, their confidences are otherwise pro-
tected under the lawyer's duty of confidentiality under the legal ethics codes. While
authorities agree that joint clients waive the attorney-client privilege, see, e.g.. Eureka
Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that communications to plan legal action of one joint client against the other were not
for purposes of joint representation and were therefore protected by the attorney-client
privilege), differences exist regarding whether they waive the duty of confidentiality.
Most authorities agree with Professors Hazard and Koniak. See, eg., N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n
Op. Comm. on Professional Ethics, 555 (1984) [hereinafter N.Y.S. Bar Op. 555] (requir-
ing duty of confidentiality between joint clients); Monroe County Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Op. 87-2 (1987) (lawyer not permitted to disclose co-plaintiff husband's intent to
divorce co-plaintiff wife); 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:306 (in representing
spouses jointly for an amicable divorce, even where the proposed "agreement is slightly
more favorable to one party than is normal for someone in that party's economic posi-
tion[, the lawyer's] duty to the advantaged client would be to withhold disclosure of the
fact, since such a disclosure would violate the basic confidentiality of Rule 1.6."); cf Hotz
v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634, 637 (S.C. 1991) (while upholding a claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty against lawyer who had separately represented both father and daughter and
had affirmatively misled daughter as to existence of a second will diminishing her be-
quest, court acknowledged that the lawyer "had no duty to disclose the existence of the
second will against his client's (Mr. Minyard's) wishes."). Some authorities, however,
suggest that joint clients impliedly waive confidentiality with regard to each other. See,
eg., Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F. Supp. 790, 800 (1977) (finding parties waived confidential-
ity with regard to each other); ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 37 (1993) (joint "representation usually implies that information will be
shared by clients with respect to the subject of the representation"); N.Y.S. Bar Op. 555,
supra (discussing authorities that reject duty of confidentiality between joint clients). At
least one authority has required that spouses waive the lawyer's confidentiality duty to
each as individuals before commencing joint representation. See Allegheny County Bar
Association Professional Ethics Committee, Estate Planning-Attorney Representing
Both Spouses, 131 Pitt. Legal J. 28, 30 (1983) [hereinafter Allegheny County Bar Op.]
(waiver necessary to prevent fraud or conflicts). For a further discussion of confidential-
ity issues, see Burnele Powell & Ronald Link, The Sense of Client: Confidentiality Issues
in Representing the Elderly in Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Cli-
ents, Fordham L. Rev. 1197 (1994); Teresa S. Collett, Disclosure, Discretion, or Decep-
tion: The Estate Planner's Ethical Dilemma from a Unilateral Confidence, 28 Real Prop.,
Prob. & Trust J. 683 (1994) [hereinafter Collett, Disclosure].
49. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:301. Professors Hazard and Hodes note
that Rule 1.7(b) is similar to the approach of Canon 5 of the Code. Id.
50. Id
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ships ... at least as well as the lawyer[ ]," while "only the lawyer can
fully judge" "the quality of the representation to be provided."',
In addition to Rule 1.7, Rule 2.2 is relevant to conflicts issues arising
in the representation of multiple clients in a single matter. Rule 2.2 ap-
plies to "intermediary" representation which occurs "when the lawyer
represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests."'52
In the intermediary role, the lawyer seeks "to establish or adjust a rela-
tionship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous ba-
sis .... The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by
developing the parties' mutual interests."
53
Rule 2.2 requires the same types of disclosures that Rule 1.7(b) re-
quires for joint representation. Rule 2.2 specifies disclosure of "the effect
on the attorney-client privileges"54 which presumably would fall within
"advantages and risks" under Rule 1.7(b). Furthermore, Rule 2.2 sub-
stitutes two related provisions for Rule 1.7(b)'s requirement of the law-
yer's reasonable belief that "the representation will not be adversely
affected."' 56 Rule 2.2(a)(2) requires the lawyer's reasonable belief:
that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients'
best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately in-
formed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated reso-
lution is unsuccessful.57
Rule 2.2(a)(3) requires the lawyer's reasonable belief "that the common
representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper ef-
fect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients."58
Rule 2.2 was intended to provide an opportunity to "lawyer for the
situation," as opposed to individual clients. 9 The use of the term "com-
mon representation,"' in Rule 2.2 as opposed to the term "multiple cli-
ents" in Rule 1.7,61 could mean that Rule 2.2 envisions the lawyer
representing the family entity rather than the individuals.62 Similarly,
51. Id. § 1.7:305.
52. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt. While some commentators have sug-
gested a far narrower construction of Rule 2.2, see, e.g., Real Property Section's Recom-
mendations, supra note 8, at 11, Professor Dzienkowski notes that "[t]he most widely
accepted definition of intermediation focuses on the major problem that Model Rule 2.2
is designed to address, that is, the potential conflict of interest that arises between or
among the clients in a multiple representation." Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 772.
53. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt.
54. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(1).
55. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
56. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
57. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(2).
58. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(3).
59. Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 744; 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, §§ 2.2:102,
2.2:103.
60. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(1).
61. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2). See also Model Code, supra note 23,
Canon 5, EC 5-15 to 5-19.
62. See Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 972 & n.37 (In contrast to "common
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Rule 2.2 speaks of the "clients' best interests," rather than the interest of
each client separately,63 and the Comment to the Rule discusses adjust-
ing a "relationship." 64 The language and intent of Rule 2.2 could there-
fore support a broader representation of individuals with conflicting
interest than Rule 1.7.
Despite these considerations, most commentators have concluded that
Rule 2.2 does not afford lawyers an opportunity to undertake or continue
a representation that would be prohibited by Rule 1.7. Professor
Thomas Shaffer observes that Rule 2.2's use of "a behavioral checklist to
make exceptional, multiple-client employment possible" evidences that
"[t]he rule rests on the assumption that employment by individuals is the
norm." 6 Indeed, as noted above, the conditions that a lawyer must sat-
isfy to represent clients under Rule 2.2 are only a more specific explica-
tion of Rule 1.7's requirements.66 Accordingly, Professors Hazard and
Koniak observe that Rule 2.2 "may be considered a specific application
of 1.7(b)."' 7
In light of the similarities between Rules 1.7(b) and 2.2, it is unclear
whether Rule 2.2 or Rule 1.7 governs a joint representation. The Com-
ment to Rule 2.2 which applies the rule to all situations where "the law-
yer represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting
interests, ' 68 suggests that it includes all joint representations. Such a
construction, however, would be inconsistent with the express language
of Rule 1.7(b) which contemplates "representation of multiple clients in
a single matter., 69 A more plausible interpretation is that the lawyer
may choose to apply Rule 2.2 in appropriate cases where the lawyer
makes the disclosures, obtains the consents, and reaches the objective
conclusions required by Rule 2.2. Indeed, Professors Hazard and Hodes
observe that the provisions of Rule 2.2 "are so confining that prudent
lawyers often will not undertake this role, but will treat the representa-
representation," "multiple clients" suggests that "(1) prototypical lawyer employment is
employment by an individual and (2) employment for more than one person on the same
matter is, in some sense, employment by each of them.").
63. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(2).
64. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt.
65. Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 972.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
67. Hazard & Koniak, supra note 48, at 588. Professors Hazard and Hodes observe
"that it might well have been possible either to dispense with Rule 2.2 altogether or to
have made it a subsection of Rule 1.7 .... Rule 2.2 reiterates much of the language of
Rule 1.7(b)(2) in requiring caution, consultation, and consent." 1 Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 27, § 1.7:102.
68. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt. (Rule 2.2 applies to situations where
"[t]he lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties'
mutual interests.").
69. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2). Indeed, in the event of a conflict
between the comment to Rule 2.2 and the text of Rule 1.7(b), the text of Rule 1.7(b)
prevails. See id. at Scope (Although "[t]he Comments are intended as guides to interpre-
tation, ... the text of each Rule is authoritative.").
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tions as... involving a 'consented conflict' under Rule 1.7(b)." 70
Another possibility for analyzing conflicts is to view the client as an
organization. Under Rule 1.13, the lawyer represents the organization,
not its constituents.7 If a conflict arises between a constituent and the
organization, the lawyer's duty is to represent the organization.72 In
such circumstances, the lawyer has an obligation to make sure that the
constituent "understands that ... the lawyer for the organization cannot
provide legal representation for that constituent individual and that dis-
cussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may
not be privileged."73
The last rule generally relevant to conflicts in family representation is
Rule 1.9 which governs conflicts between current and former clients.
Rule 1.9 bars representation of a client "in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation."74 If the concurrent representation commenced under
Rule 2.2, the restrictions on continuing to represent one multiple client
after withdrawal from representing another are even stricter. Rule 2.2
requires the lawyer to withdraw from representing all multiple clients "if
any of the clients so requests" or if any of the conditions of the represen-
tation are no longer satisfied.75
B. Applying Conflicts Doctrine to Spousal Representation
As in any other matter, the lawyer should as a "first step ... identify
whether a conflict exists."76 Professor Wolfram suggests that the lawyer
"identifyf- at the outset of the representation the legal and other interests
that the several clients have and that they may wish to assert or seriously
consider as the transaction proceeds."77
If the lawyer discovers that the spouses' interests are directly adverse,
Rule 1.7(a) virtually prevents her from representing both.78 One exam-
ple of where some authorities permit representation of spouses whose in-
terests are directly adverse is in the preparation of a dissolution
agreement in an amicable situation where the spouses consent to joint
representation and "reasonable prospects of an agreement exist. 7 9
70. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 2.2:103.
71. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13.
72. See id. cmt.
73. Id.
74. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9(a).
75. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(c).
76. Wolfram, supra note 24, § 7.3.4.
77. Id. See Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211, cmt. c ("While a
lawyer should not try to suggest discord where none exists, when a material conflict is
reasonably foreseeable, the lawyer must be sure that all affected clients are informed of
the advantages and risks to them of the multiple representation and have given uncoerced
consent.").
78. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
79. Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. d, illus. 3. See also I
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Even where the lawyer does not find direct adversity, she may discover
evidence that representation of one spouse "may be materially limited"
by representation of the other under Rule 1.7(b).80 Although Rule 1.7(b)
and its comment do not offer specific guidance for spousal representa-
tion,8" the authorities suggest that dual representation will often create a
potential material limit because of the spouses' many potential differing
interests. In estate planning, for example, spouses may have different
interests regarding which assets should be provided to each other, their
children together, other children they may have, relatives, friends, and
charities; which assets are joint and separate; the implications of the
rights each spouse might have to a statutory share and whether a waiver
of such rights is appropriate; and whether to use trusts and asset trans-
fers to minimize tax liabilities.82 In light of these difficult issues, Profes-
sor Jeffrey Pennell, a leading scholar in the area of trusts and estates, has
observed that even when representation of spouses begins, "the risk of
conflict is significant.... There always is the potential for conflicts of
interest in a representation of both spouses."83 Similarly, the proposed
Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:202. Authorities permitting and forbidding joint
representation in an amicable divorce are collected in Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 762-
63 n. 119. The Restatement limits its endorsement of joint representation to the prepara-
tion of the dissolution agreement, see Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra, note 28,
§ 209 cmt. c; § 211 cmt. d; but acknowledges that some authorities permit joint represen-
tation of the spouses in hearings on uncontested divorces. See id. § 209, Reporter's Note,
cmt. c.; see also Wolfram, supra note 24, § 7.3.4 (observing that courts are more tolerant
of conflicts in nonlitigation matters).
80. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b).
81. The comment to Rule 1.7 does refer to estate planning but offers no specific gui-
dance. It acknowledges that "[c]onflict questions may also arise in estate planning and
estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of
interest may arise." Rule 1.7 cmt. It is unclear whether this language merely acknowl-
edges, like other authorities, that potential differences exist in most such representations,
see infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text, or whether, to the contrary of those author-
ities, the language implies that spousal representation does not pose potential differences
unless particular facts of the representations suggest so. See ABA Real Property Sec-
tion's Comm. on Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice, De-
velopments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lanyer The
Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1. 17
(1987) [hereinafter Developments] (suggesting language of comment "was intended to
avoid any automatic finding of conflict of interest in the family estate planning context").
The Model Code includes estate beneficiaries as an example of clients whose "potentially
differing interests," EC 5-17, should lead the lawyer to "resolve all doubts against the
propriety of the representation." Model Code, supra note 23, EC 5-15.
82. This list of potential differences is based on Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate
Planning and Fiduciary Administration: The Inadequacy of the Model Rules and the
Model Code, 45 Rec. Ass'n. B. City N.Y. 715, 719 (1990). See also Allegheny County
Bar Op., supra note 48, at 28 ("[D]istrust, divergent distributive views, avarice, second
marriages, etc., can quickly generate direct conflict between the interests of husband and
wife.").
83. Pennell, supra note 82, at 719. The Report of the Committee on Significant New
Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice of the Real Property Section notes that
"the probate, trust and estate planning practitioner is frequently found in a thicket of
multiple representations where the conflicts between the various parties' interests are sub-
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Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers finds that where the spouses
ask a lawyer to draft "reciprocal wills" there exists "substantial risk that
the lawyer's representation of [one spouse] would be materially and ad-
versely affected by the lawyer's duties [to the other]."84
Another common situation where differences potentially limit repre-
sentation occurs where the lawyer "has had substantial prior dealings
with one member of the couple but not the other."85 Professors Hazard
and Hodes suggest two types of limits which may result. First, "it is
likely that [the lawyer] will have confidences of the established client that
he cannot reveal to the other client, but which the other client has a need
to know."86 Second, the lawyer "may not trust his own ability to be fair
to both by putting aside his prior relationship."87 In these cases, while
"self-disqualification" is not "automatic," the lawyer "should be particu-
larly careful to explain his concerns, and to make certain that the estab-
lished client authorizes him to reveal all confidences to the other
spouse."88 If the lawyer discovers "[t]he slightest hesitation on the part
of the established client[, it] is a warning that he or she considers himself
or herself to be the 'main' client, and [the lawyer] must then refuse to
represent the other."' 9
In many instances of spousal representation, therefore, Rule 1.7(b) will
require the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent to the represen-
tation in light of the potential for material limits and to reach a reason-
able belief that the representation of one will not adversely affect
representation of the other.90 If the spouses are to be represented jointly,
the consultation must include a discussion "of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved." 9' In
light of the potential differences, the lawyer could also represent the
spouses under Rule 2.2. She would then have to satisfy the requirements
tle, pervasive, indirect, continuously shifting and, in many instances, even difficult to rec-
ognize." Developments, supra, note 81, at 2.
84. Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 & § 211 cmt. c, illus. See
also Wolfram, supra note 24, § 7.3.4 at 356-57 ("arranging for one client ... to sign a will
leaving substantial property to another client" presents a "conflicting representation[ ]"
where a "material interest of different clients diverges in a significant way").
85. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:306. See Model Rules, supra note 23,
Rule 1.7 cmt. (in assessing potential adverse affects in non-litigation conflicts, lawyer
should consider "the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or
clients involved").
86. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.7:306.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Indeed, in estate planning, it seems impossible to conceive of a situation where
spouses would not have at least potential differences with regard to disposition of their
assets. See Pennell, supra note 82, at 729-30 (under existing rules, "the estate planner's
only safe approach is to assume the knowing consent of each affected individual is
required").
91. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2). See also Allegheny County Bar Op.,
supra note 48, (because of potentially differing interests, DR 5-105(c) requires disclosure
and consent before joint representation of spouses in estate planning).
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of disclosure and consent, as well as the objective determinations re-
quired by that Rule.92
If conflicts develop during representation, the lawyer will have to with-
draw from representing one or both spouses.93 Under Rule 1.9, the law-
yer could not continue to represent one spouse in the same or
substantially related matter where the spouses' interests were materially
adverse without the other spouse's consent.94 This would appear gener-
ally to bar a lawyer from continuing to represent one spouse where con-
flicts had developed in representing both.95 If the representation is under
Rule 2.2, the lawyer must withdraw from representing both at the re-
quest of either or if the conditions for representation are no longer
satisfied.96
Rule 1.13 offers another possible perspective on conflicts in family rep-
resentation. The text and comment to Rule 1.13 authorize a lawyer to
represent an organization, as opposed to its constituents. The Rule ap-
plies to organizations of any size, whether incorporated or not.9 7 Rule
1.13 does not define the term "organization," but does describe Rule
1.13's purpose as providing representation for legal entities which "can-
not act except through ... constituents." 98 This would seem to include
families which are often "legal entities" that can act only through con-
stituent family members.99 Professors Hazard and Hodes further sug-
gest that the crux of eligibility for representation under Rule 1.13 is
92. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a).
93. Where representation will violate Rule 1.7, withdrawal is mandatory. See Model
Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7 cmt.; Rule 1.16(a)(l). Rule 1.16 requires withdrawal
where "representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct .... "
Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.16(a)(1). The Model Code similarly requires the
lawyer to withdraw if he "knows or it is obvious that [his] continued employment will
result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule." Model Code, supra note 23, DR 2-1 10(B)(2).
94. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9(a).
95. See Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 115-16 (concluding that where attor-
ney prepared wills for spouses as joint clients, Rule 1.9 bars subsequent representation of
one spouse to draft a will secretly and to the disadvantage of the other); Wolfram, supra
note 24, § 7.3.4 at 358 ("A hazard of joint representation, however, is that if the transac-
tion breaks down and litigation ensues, the lawyer may not represent either party because
of the confidentiality principle.") (footnote omitted).
96. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(c).
97. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13 & cmt.; Stephen Ellmann, Client-
Centeredness Multiplied. Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public In-
terest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1115-18 (1992).
98. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13 cmt.
99. The laws of divorce, testacy, and intestacy recognize a marriage as a legal institu-
tion. See infra notes 157-60. So do concepts of joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety.
See 1 Arthur R. Gaudio, The American Law of Real Property § 4.02 (1991); 4 George
W. Thompson, Real Property §§ 1770-74, 1784. Other areas of law that similarly pro-
vide for the family as a legal entity include bankruptcy and tax. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1988) (permitting joint bankruptcy filing); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (1988) ("[a]
husband and wife may make a single return jointly of income taxes"); 26 U.S.C.§ 6212(b)(2) (1988) (where there is a joint income tax filing, "notice of deficiency may be
a single joint notice"); 42 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1988) (allowing for exercise of priorities by "a
husband and wife ... in their joint names").
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whether "the group will be regarded as an entity that is distinct from its
individual constituents. ' ' "° While formality of "the association, the
longer its duration, and the more elaborate its purposes" evidence orga-
nizational status, "even a small group informally organized for a limited
purpose can be considered an entity."' 0 ' Both traditional and non-tradi-
tional families have elements of formality, duration, and elaborate pur-
poses sufficient to fall within this understanding of Rule 1.13.102
Despite the existence of a reasonable fit between Rule 1.13 and family
representation, no authority has yet applied Rule 1.13 to family represen-
tation. 10 3 Perhaps this is due to the pervasiveness of the assumption in
established doctrine that family members are separable individuals. 10
Perhaps, too, authorities have understood Rule 1.13's use of corporate
governance terminology, such as references to shareholders and boards
of directors, to indicate an intent to limit the scope of Rule 1.13 to busi-
ness or business-like organizations. In any event, the absence of author-
ity for applying Rule 1.13 to families should make a practitioner leery of
doing so.
C. Specific Application of Conflicts Doctrine
This Section reviews the application of the established doctrine to two
hypothetical situations which further illustrate the operation of the estab-
lished doctrine in spousal representation.
1. The Estate Hypothetical
The Estate Hypothetical presents Ms. Lawyer with two separate quan-
daries: whether to represent John and Mary initially and what to do
after Mary's phone call asking her to prepare a separate will and keep it
confidential from John. °5 As to the first, at the initial meeting with John
and Mary, Ms. Lawyer should explain the potential differing interests the
spouses could have and explored whether any actual or potential differ-
ences existed. The authorities discussed above suggest that even if there
is no evidence of direct adversity or existing differences, Ms. Lawyer
should treat the situation as one posing a potential material limit on the
lawyer's representation under Rule 1.7(b).1°6 Of course, if Ms. Lawyer
had previously represented one of the spouses separately, that would spe-
cifically implicate Rule 1.7(b).' °7 Accordingly, Ms. Lawyer should ob-
tain the clients' consent to the representation after explaining "the
100. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.13:103.
101. Id. § 1.13:103.
102. See generally Franklin, supra note 12, at 1048-50.
103. See, e.g., Batt, supra note 17, at 336 (suggesting change in Rule 2.2 to accommo-
date entity representation of family similar to Rule 1.13).
104. See, e.g., Allegheny Bar Op., supra note 48, at 28 (observing that representation of
a family is the representation of individuals and not the family unit).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 80-91.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
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implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved." ' 8 Ms. Lawyer may proceed with the representation only if
she "reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected"' 9 by the potential material limit on her responsibilities."' As-
suming these conditions have been satisfied, Ms. Lawyer can undertake
the representation under Rule 1.7(b).
Ms. Lawyer can similarly decide that she prefers to represent John and
Mary under Rule 2.2 if she makes the disclosures, obtains the consents,
and makes the determinations required by that rule."' It does not ap-
pear, however, that Rule 2.2 provides Ms. Lawyer, John or Mary with
any particular advantages." 2
Assuming Ms. Lawyer has commenced representation under either
Rule 1.7(b) or Rule 2.2, Ms. Lawyer next faces the question of how to
respond to Mary's request that Ms. Lawyer prepare a new, different will
for Mary and keep both the conversation and the terms of the will confi-
dential from John. The conversation suggests direct adversity implicat-
ing Rule 1.7(a) insofar as Mary's desire for confidentiality from John
reflects her view that this course of action would put her in opposition to
John's goals. Mary's request also suggests a material limit on the law-
yer's zealous representation of John, who would probably want to know
of this information in making his own plans.' ' Even though Ms. Law-
yer has previously obtained consent from John under Rule 1.7(b), the
circumstances of the conversation indicate that it is unlikely that John
contemplated that he was consenting to the course of action proposed by
Mary. 1
14
To remedy the situation, Ms. Lawyer can attempt to persuade Mary
either to discuss the matter with John or to permit Ms. Lawyer to talk to
John. If Mary agrees to either course, Ms. Lawyer will then have to
consider whether the particular facts present "direct adversity" or only a
108. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
109. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b)(l).
110. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7(b).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 52-70; see also I Hazard & Hodes, supra note
27, § 2.2:103 ("[t]heoreticay, little is gained or lost by proceeding as if under Rule 1.7(b)
rather than Rule 2.2").
113. See e.g., Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (hold-
ing that client has a right to information "which, if known to the client, might well have
caused him, acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course of conduct"); N.Y.S.
Bar Ass'n Op. 555, supra note, 48 (providing relevant information to client "is a duty
owed by an agent acting in a fiduciary capacity") (citing Restatement (Second) Agency §
381 (1957)); Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 142-43.
114. See Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 202 cmt. f ("significant
change in the factual basis on which the client originally gave consent may justify a client
in withdrawing consent"); cf. Mercer D. Tate, Handling conflicts of interest that may
occur in an estate planning practice, 16 Est. Plan. 32, 36 (1989) (where lawyer represents
Mr. and Mrs. Able in estate planning, "if Mr. Able attempts to have you make a secret
change to his will, you should decline further estate services to him and advise Mrs. Able
that you are no longer able to provide estate planning services to her").
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"material limit" and therefore satisfy the conditions for continuing repre-
sentation under Rules 1.7(a) or 1.7(b), or, if applicable, Rule 2.2.
If Mary refuses to permit disclosure, Ms. Lawyer probably could not
obtain the necessary consent from John to continue representation under
Rules 1.7(a) or 1.7(b).115 At this point, where Ms. Lawyer began repre-
senting John and Mary jointly for their estate planning, the planning for
one is "the same or a substantially related matter"'1 16 as planning for the
other and the interests of the two would be "materially adverse.", 1" 7 Ms.
Lawyer would therefore have to withdraw from representing both John
and Mary under Rule 1.9.118 While most authorities suggest that Ms.
Lawyer would have to keep Mary's confidence from John, some author-
ity is to the contrary.' 19
The situation is more complicated under Rule 2.2. The split of author-
ity makes it impossible to determine a generally accepted approach to
whether the duty of confidentiality to any individual client arises under
Rule 2.2.121 Whether or not any duty of confidentiality arises, Mary's
refusal to disclose, as well as the prejudice to Mary of disclosure or to
John of non-disclosure, would vitiate the impartial and non-prejudicial
representation necessary to satisfy Rule 2.2,121 and would require Ms.
Lawyer to withdraw from representing both John and Mary even before
disclosure pursuant to Rule 2.2(c).' 22
115. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7 cmt. ("when the lawyer represents dif-
ferent clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure
necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot
properly ask the latter to consent").
116. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9(a). See Collett, And the Two, supra note 10,
at 115.
117. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9(a). See Collett, And the Two, supra note 10,
at 116.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
119. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
120. See Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 805. The language of the comment to Rule 2.2
is ambiguous. It provides both that "the lawyer is still required.., to maintain confiden-
tiality of information relating to the representation," and that "between commonly repre-
sented clients the privilege does not attach." Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt.
The former quote appears to apply to confidentiality of the common representation with
regard to third parties, but it could be read to apply to individual clients. The latter
quote, by expressly indicating the privilege does not attach, might be read to imply that
the duty of confidentiality does attach as it does under joint representation pursuant to
Rule 1.7(b). Compare Wolfram, supra note 24, at 729 and N.Y. State Bar Op. 555, supra
note 48 (comment to Rule 2.2 suggests that duty of confidentiality applies to individuals)
with 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 2.2:202 ("While Rule 1.6 will continue to
protect the confidences of each of the clients from disclosure to third parties, Rule 2.2
will require that those same confidences be shared within the group.").
121. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a); 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27,
§ 2.2:202 (parties' refusal to share confidences "is highly suggestive that the requisite
trust is lacking, and that intermediation ought not be attempted.").
122. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(c).
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2. The Nursing Home Hypothetical
When Ozzie and Harriet inform Mr. Lawyer that they disagree as to
whether Harriet should enter a nursing home but want to reach a con-
sensus,123 they present a conflicts problem. Despite their desire to seek a
resolution of their differences, Ozzie and Harriet's interests are directly
adverse in that they seek opposing goals. Under Rule 1.7(a), Mr. Lawyer
would have to obtain their consent and make a reasonable determination
that the representation would not adversely affect the relationship with
each. On one hand, such a representation is not totally foreclosed. The
proposed Restatement suggests:
even if the possibility of litigation is substantial at the outset of the
representation, and even though consent would not permit the lawyer
to represent all parties if litigation should result .... a lawyer could
accept multiple representation in an effort to reconcile the differences
of the clients short of litigation."124
On the other hand, Rule 1.7(a) essentially bans such representation.' 25
In light of the grave importance to Ozzie and Harriet of the issue of
Harriet's institutionalization, any differences that arise during the repre-
sentation are likely to cause feelings of anger and betrayal. It is therefore
reasonably foreseeable that the representation of both will to some degree
adversely affect Mr. Lawyer's relationship with one or the other.'" 6
Even if the representation satisfied Rule 1.7(a), it would pose further
problems under Rule 1.7(b). In this instance, representation of both
would probably prejudice the position of one or the other in the potential
future litigation. For example, conversations with Mr. Lawyer, which
would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege in subsequent liti-
gation between Ozzie and Harriet, might provide valuable evidence for
one party or the other.1 27 Accordingly, even if the clients consented to
these risks, Mr. Lawyer would be likely to believe reasonably that repre-
sentation of one spouse could "adversely affect" the representation of the
other and decline representation under Rule 1.7(b).
If Ozzie and Harriet presented the extraordinary circumstances which
would permit representation under Rule 1.7 or 2.2, Mr. Lawyer would be
unable to represent either in the litigation between them, in the event the
attempt at conciliation fails. 2 ' Rule 1.9 would bar representation in the
"same or substantially related matter" where Ozzie and Harriet would be
123. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
124. Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. d.
125. See Model Rules, supra note 23, 1.7(a). See supra text accompanying notes 38-
43.
126. See supra note 41.
127. See Model Rules, supra note 23, 1.7(b). See supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
128. See e.g., Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. d. ("the
effort to overcome differences might ultimately fail and require the lawyer's partial or
complete withdrawal from the matter"); Wolfram, supra note 24, § 7.3.4, at 358 ("A
hazard of joint representation.., is that if the transaction breaks down and litigation
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materially adverse absent the other's consent.' 29 Rule 2.2 would require
withdrawal from representation of both upon the request of either or
upon the failure of any of the conditions for the representation.130
II. THE ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FAMILY
This Part examines the established doctrine's perspective on the family
by placing the established doctrine in the context of legal developments
regarding the family. While recognizing the family both as an entity and
as a collection of individuals, the trend in the law has been to move from
considering the family as a unit to considering it as a collection of indi-
viduals. Following this trend, established legal ethics doctrine favors the
individual over the family unit. The structure of established doctrine
also provides that the legal profession or the lawyer, and not the family,
determine the contours of family representation.
Many commentators have observed that, beginning in the Enlighten-
ment, Western culture has shifted from the perspective "that family and
marriage were the essential determinants of an individual's economic se-
curity and social standing"' 31 to the notion that the individual deter-
mines her own standing. 3 2 Professor Raymond Williams observes:
The emergence of notions of individuality, in the modem sense, can
be related to the break-up of the medieval social, economic and reli-
gious order. In the general movement against feudalism there was a
new stress on a man's personal existence over and above his place or
function in a rigid hierarchial society.1 33
Sir Henry Maine's famous observation of the move "from Status to Con-
tract"' 134 refers to the transformation from "a society in which all the
relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family ... to-
wards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the
free agreement of Individuals."'' 35 Complementing this change were
political philosophies which "began from individuals, who had an initial
and primary existence, and laws and forms of society were derived from
them: by submission, as in Hobbes; by contract or consent, or by the
ensues, the lawyer may not represent either party because of the confidentiality
principle.").
129. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9(a), (c).
130. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(c).
131. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 292 (1989) [hereinafter,
Glendon, Transformation].
132. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 42 (1981) [here-
inafter Glendon, The New Family].
133. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society 163 (rev.
ed. 1983). Professor Williams also notes "a related stress, in Protestantism, on a man's
direct and individual relation to God, as opposed to this relation MEDIATED (q.v.) by
the Church." Id. at 163-64.
134. Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law 422 app. (Peter Smith ed. 1970) (10th ed. 1884).
135. Id. at 99. See Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in Feminist Legal Theory of
the Family: A Reply to Bartlett, 12 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 103, 105-06 (1990) (discussing
Maine's observations); Glendon, The New Family, supra note 132, at 41-43 (same).
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new version of natural law, in liberal thought."' 36
The law reflected this transformation. Professor Mary Ann Glendon
notes that until recently "[flamily solidarity and the community of life
between spouses were emphasized over the individual personalities and
interests of family."' 37 According to Professor Lawrence Friedman, the
law aspired to "empower[ ] families, rather than individuals."' 38 The
State sought to preserve families and make difficult their dissolution. Di-
vorce "was only permitted for state-defined reasons-acts constituting
'fault.' "139 Within the family, the husband had "despotic rights,". ° "to
govern and discipline family members." 4 ' Professor Martha Minow ob-
serves that "criminal laws against rape and assault exempted husbands
and no rules against child abuse existed until the end of the nineteenth
century. ' 142 Under the entity theory of the family, the law refused to
136. Williams, supra note 133, at 164. Like the field of mathematics, "[t]he political
thought of the Enlightenment mainly followed [the] model" of "postulat[ing] the individ-
ual as the substantial entity... from which other categories and especially collective
categories were derived." Id Professor Williams further observes that "[i]n classical eco-
nomics, trade was described in a model which postulated separate individuals who de-
cided, at some starting point, to enter into economics or commercial relations." Id. See
also Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life 143 (1985) (tracing individualism in American culture to the Lockean
tradition that "[tihe individual is prior to society, which comes into existence only
through the voluntary contract of individuals trying to maximize their own self-inter-
est"). The use of the individual as the basic political unit was not without opposition.
Conservatives, such as Burke, argued that "'the individual is foolish .... the species is
wise.'" Williams, supra note 133, at 164. From the left, Marx "attacked the opposition
of the abstract categories 'individual' and 'society' and argued that the individual is a
social creation, born into relations and DETERMINED (q.v.) by them." Id.
137. Glendon, Transformation, supra note 131, at 291. See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese,
The Legal Status of Families as Institutions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 992, 992 (1992) ("[O]ur
legal tradition.., has preferred to treat the family as a corporate unit rather than as a
collection of isolated individuals."). Blackstone wrote:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing .... Upon this principle, of an
union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties,
and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.
Id. (quoting William Blackstone, Of the Rights of Persons, in I Commentaries of the
Laws of England 430 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765) (citations omitted)).
138. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of the Self in Legal Culture, 38 Clev. St. L
Rev. 517, 533 (1990).
139. Martha A. Fineman, The Illusion of Equality 19 (1991). Moreover, Professor
Lawrence Friedman notes that "[i]n England, divorce was, basically, not available at all
until 1857, and in the United States, divorce was not common even in those states (chiefly
northern) which permitted judicial divorce and did not require a special act of the legisla-
ture to end a marriage." Friedman, supra note 137, at 531-32 (footnotes omitted).
140. Friedman, supra note 138, at 533.
141. Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 Utah L Rev. 1,
14 (1991).
142. Id at 13-14. See also Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional
Family, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 997, 997 (1992) (analyzing the traditional family model in
which the law permitted a husband to beat and rape his wife).
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enforce contracts between family members or to permit them to sue each
other. 143
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has observed that the law has shifted
"increasingly to emphasize the individuality of the members of the conju-
gal family as well as to facilitate their independence from it and each
other ' ' " as a result of the modem emphasis on "[i]ndividual liberty and
the relative independence and equality of family members" . . . made
possible by the decreasing economic importance of the marriage and the
family." '145 While "individualistic, egalitarian, and secularizing trends
... have been gaining power in Western legal systems since the late eight-
eenth century, "  most changes in law occurred in the 1960s and
thereafter. 147
As Professor Friedman notes, "family law has evolved . . . toward
fragmenting the family legally speaking, into separate individuals."'4 a
With the development of statutes permitting divorce without fault, "ac-
cess to divorce [has been] made easy."' 4 9 Within the family, the husband
is no longer the ruler of a cohesive unit. The Supreme Court has held
that the Constitution prohibits States from requiring a wife to obtain her
husband's consent for her abortion. 5° Governmental authorities now
prosecute husbands for marital rape as well for spouse and child
abuse.' 5 ' With regard to civil liability, Professor Minow notes that
"courts have recognized and enforced contracts between family members
and permitted tort suits."' 15 2
While the trend is to treat family members as individuals, that is not
the exclusive approach of modem law. The law respects the family's au-
thority unless a compelling interest, such as the prevention of the abuse
and neglect of children, justifies intervention. 153 Despite the increased
143. See Minow, supra note 141, at 13.
144. Glendon, The New Family, supra note 132, at 43.
145. Id. at 41. Professor Glendon observes that today, in contrast, while "[flamilies
... continue to exert an extremely important influence on the life prospects of their
members," Glendon, Transformation, supra note 131, at 292, "an individual's wealth,
power, and standing are decreasingly determined by family membership and increasingly
by his or her own labor force activity, or in a negative way, by his or her dependency
relationship with government." Id.
146. Glendon, Transformation, supra note 131, at 292.
147. See id.
148. Friedman, supra note 138, at 533. See also, e.g., Glendon, Transformation, supra
note 131, at 295 ("pervasive in all the recent developments we have surveyed is the ten-
dency for law and social programs to break the family down into its component parts and
to treat family members as separate and independent").
149. Fineman, supra note 139, at 19.
150. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); Minow, supra note
141, at 14.
151. See Minow, supra note 141, at 14. Some states, however, continue to exempt
spousal rape from rape statutes. See Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Devel-
opments in the Law of Marital Rape, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 343, 343-44 (1989).
152. Minow, supra note 141, at 14.
153. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 1051; see also Dolgin, supra note 135, at 107
("Present law, like the society it reflects, assumes that the family is and should remain
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recognition of children as legal actors separate from the family,'- courts
generally continue to evaluate parenthood as a matter of status in surro-
gate motherhood' and adoption cases."5 6 Although "the state's con-
cern [in divorce] now centers on 'equity' and 'justice' between the
spouses in dividing up their accumulated debts and assets and in award-
ing custody of their children[,]" 5 7 property awards and custody determi-
nations continue to include notions that the family is a community for
both economic and child rearing purposes.'55 The doctrine of tenancy by
the entirety, while changing to acknowledge women's equality, continues
to treat the interests of husband and wife as a unity.I 9 In accord with
the view of the family as a community is the trend to increase the surviv-
ing spouse's rights under both intestacy and testacy.1 Similarly, the
recently enacted Family and Medical Leave Act seeks to support mem-
bership in family units by providing a legal right for individuals to fulfill
obligations to other family members.' 6'
Like these other areas of law,' 62 legal ethics mixes treatment of fami-
lies as collections of individuals and communities. Legal ethics both lim-
its representation of the family as a unit when conflicts would interfere
with adequate representation of individuals and acknowledges that, at
least in some ways, families are communities.
The framework for legal ethics is representation of the individual.
Professor John Leubsdorf has noted that "[t]he lawyer-client relationship
primarily a universe defined in status terms, a universe of love, not money, of commit-
ment, not negotiation, of relationship, not autonomy.") (footnote omitted).
154. See, eg., Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at 83 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (holding that child has standing in dispute regarding parental rights to
her).
155. See Dolgin, supra note 135, at 108-10.
156. See, e.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1993) (rejecting adoption of
child on ground that biological father had not consented to adoption despite evidence of
"'exemplary care'" on the part of prospective adoptive parents and "poor performance
record as a parent" on the part of biological father). But see Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at
*5-*6 (rejecting attempt of biological parents to assert parental rights to child that others
have raised).
157. Fineman, supra note 139, at 19.
158. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, N.Y..J., Sept. 24, 1993, at 22 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (in awarding wife share of husband's interest as partner in Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, court notes "that a marriage is an economic partnership, and the compensation of
the one who is employed is, in that sense, earned by the married couple as a team");
Gerald D. McLellan, Equitable Distribution Law and Practice § 1.9 (1985) ("[tlhe un-
derlying premise of the concept [of equitable distribution] is to consider the marriage to
be an economic financial partnership, and in the event of a divorce, to distribute the
property under the guiding force of equity"); J. Thomas Oldham, Divorce, Separation
and the Distribution of Property § 3.02[2][d] (1990) ("[c]ourts now generally perceive
marriage as a partnership whose term is the duration of the marriage").
159. See Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 120-21.
160. See Glendon, The New Family, supra note 132, at 58-60; 7 Richard R. Powell &
Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property 994[l] (1993) (discussing intestacy and the
rights of spouses).
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1993).
162. See supra notes 144-61 and accompanying text.
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traditionally has been conceived as one between individuals.' 63
Although joint representation of clients as individuals is permitted under
Rules 1.7 and 2.2, consideration of a group as an entity is rare. Group
representation arises under only one rule, Rule 1.13, which appears to
deal with corporations and business organizations.16' Even in the con-
text of corporate representation, Professor Hazard has observed that the
application of norms derived from individual representation to corporate
representation have made "the responses of courts and scholars... baf-
fled and baffling."1 65
Those applying the conflicts rules to family representation acknowl-
edge the primacy of viewing clients as separable individuals. A leading
bar opinion notes that while "one tends at times to think abstractly in
terms of preserving the 'estate' or benefiting the 'family,' as a whole, the
professional estate planner is, in fact, representing individuals.' 66 Simi-
larly, in discussing family representation, commentator Gerald Le Van
reminds lawyers that "[tihe legal world focuses on individuals as basic
units in society."1 67
Indeed, the very existence of conflicts rules illustrate the individual
orientation of legal ethics. These rules require the lawyer to provide "ex-
clusive devotion" to the interests of her client.1 68 The task of providing
exclusive devotion, and of avoiding conflicts between clients' interests,
rests on the assumption that one can identify separable, individual inter-
ests of clients. In contrast, as Professor Hazard has observed, if lawyers
viewed clients as "complex interdependencies," clients' situations would
163. John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev.
825, 825 (1992). He observes that "this conception is built into the very words we use to
describe the relationship. Scholarship, professional rules, and judicial opinions speak of
'a lawyer' and 'a client.'" Id. (footnote omitted). See also Ellmann, supra note 97, at
1104 ("the reader of the codes of legal ethics might be forgiven for assuming that most
legal work is done on behalf of individuals"). Professor Theresa Glennon further ob-
serves that the dominant approach to teaching professional responsibility in law school
"is based on a 'liberal' vision of a social world peopled by autonomous, separate individu-
als in competition with one another." Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building
an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1176 (1992).
164. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13; supra text accompanying notes 97-
104.
165. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analy-
sis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15, 30 (1987).
166. Allegheny County Bar Op., supra note 48, at 28.
167. Gerald Le Van, Lawyers, Families and Feelings: Representing the Family Rela-
tionship, 5 Prob. & Prop., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 19, 21.
168. The origin of established doctrine is often traced to Justice Storey's observation
that "[w]hen a client employs an attorney, he has a right to presume, if the latter be silent
on the point, that he has no engagements, which interfere, in any degree with his exclu-
sive devotion to the cause confided to him." Hazard & Koniak, supra note 48, at 580
(quoting Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason 405, 418, F. Cas. (C.C. Maine 1824) (No. 17,733).
Other commentators who find the source of conflicts doctrine in the instruction of Luke
16:13 and Matthew 6:24 paraphrase these sources to assert that "[n]o lawyer can serve
two masters." Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 143.
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"not lend themselves to analysis in terms of friend or foe."' 69
Implementing this relatively individualistic understanding of the fam-
ily, established doctrine places restrictions on family representation.
Even where the family seeks, and consents to, representation as a unit,
established doctrine requires that the lawyer refuse to initiate or continue
representation where she reasonably believes the representation or client
relationship will be adversely affected. 7 In the Nursing Home Hypo-
thetical, therefore, Mr. Lawyer probably could not represent Ozzie and
Harriet. 7 ' In the Estate Hypothetical, Ms. Lawyer would be able to
represent John and Mary initially, but would have to withdraw if Mary
insisted on keeping secret from John her intent to obtain a separate
will.172 In this way, established doctrine generally treats family members
as individuals with separable interests.
Rather than embodying a pure ethic of individualism, though, legal
ethics is similar to other areas of law that respect family choices absent a
compelling reason to the contrary. 73 Indeed, the established doctrine
expressly permits joint representation of spouses and other family mem-
bers absent impermissible conflicts. 74 While some authority expressly
prefers joint representation,'"7 a lawyer representing family members
jointly faces exposure to sanction or disqualification on conflicts grounds.
A lawyer representing only one family member faces no such risk.' 76
169. Hazard, supra note 165, at 30 (suggesting that "lawyer-guardian-ward and law-
yer-corporation-corporate officer situations" contain such "complex interdependencies").
170. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 105-22.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 144-61.
174. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text; see, eg., Restatement Governing
Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. c; Allegheny County Bar Op., supra note 48; Va. State
Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 728 (1985).
175. One bar opinion, for example, recognizes that spouses generally act as a commu-
nity to favor "solutions which are a compromise of economic benefits, personal prefer-
ences and prejudices and overall family advantage." Allegheny County Bar Op., supra
note 48, at 28 (contrasting spousal representation with a commercial situation "where
counsel is expected to achieve the maximum economic advantage for his client.") Ac-
cordingly, they view their lawyer "as an intermediary and a problem solver, not a parti-
san advocate." IL The opinion expressly prefers joint to separate representation. It
acknowledges that "[a]dversarial juxtaposition in estate planning matters can ... spark
marital discord even to the extent, in extreme cases, of encouraging resort to the ultimate
weapon in this adversary relationship-divorce." Id.
At the same time that it favors representation of spouses as a community, the opinion
recognizes that "the professional estate planner is, in fact, representing individuals." Id.
It therefore requires a "full disclosure to each party of all assets involved and the terms
and significance of the distributive scheme adopted by each." Id. at 430. It further goes
beyond the general rule of confidentiality between joint clients, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text; to require a "waiver or consent to reveal confidences or secrets."
Allegheny County Bar Op., supra note 48, at 30.
176. See, eg., Model Code, supra note 23, EC 5-15 (urging lawyers to "resolve all
doubts against the propriety of the representation").
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III. PROFESSOR THOMAS SHAFFER'S CHALLENGE TO ESTABLISHED
DOCTRINE: THE FAMILY AS AN ORGANIC COMMUNITY
Professor Thomas Shaffer challenges the established doctrine's ten-
dency to view family members as separate individuals, rather than as a
family unit. Shaffer argues that because families are communities, the
approach of the established doctrine is both unrealistic and immoral. 77
Professor Shaffer describes established doctrine as "The Legal Ethics of
Radical Individualism."'' 78 He illustrates this point with an analysis of
the approach of leading practitioners to The Case of the Unwanted
Will, 179 the hypothetical upon which this Article's Estate Hypothetical is
based. In that hypothetical, John and Mary ask a lawyer to draft wills
for them. Before John and Mary are to sign their wills, the lawyer meets
with Mary alone to ask if the terms of the will are as she desires. '8 0 Mary
says that there are:
several provisions that are contrary to her wishes, and that she would
change if her husband were not to know the ultimate disposition of her
estate. However, she says that she would not be willing to precipitate
the domestic discord and confrontation that would occur if her hus-
band were to learn that she had drawn a will contrary to his wishes
and in accordance with her own desires.' 8 '
Mary asks the lawyer to make changes and he refuses "but suggests that
she go ahead and sign this will and then, as soon as possible, go to some
other lawyer and have her will rewritten in accordance with her true
wishes."' 8 2 Mary signs the will.'8 3
In the ABA Journal article that presents The Case of the Unwanted
Will, two leading practitioners comment on the ethical issues. Both view
the lawyer as having two clients, John and Mary.I 4 Both agree that the
lawyer should not have asked to speak to Mary separately. 8 5 One com-
mentator suggests that it would have been improper even to meet with
her separately at Mary's request. He observes that the problem of
whether to sign a will she does not want "is Mary's and she should de-
cide what to do about it. The lawyer, by meeting privately with Mary,
has permitted her to transfer the problem to him."'" 6 Both commenta-
177. See Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7.
178. Id. at 963.
179. The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15.
180. See id. at 484. In the Estate Hypothetical, in contrast, Mary calls the lawyer to
ask for separate advice. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
181. The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 484.
182. Id.
183. See id. The Case of the Unwanted Will also includes facts and ethical dilemmas
not relevant to this Article. John and Mary are having their wills drafted "prior to going
on a trip abroad." Id. Mary does not obtain a new will before the trip, during which
both John and Mary die "in an airplane accident." Id.
184. See id. at 484-86.
185. See id. at 484-88.
186. Id. at 488. Cf Jeffrey N. Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms are
Needed to Accommodate Estate Planning and Family Counselling, 25 U. Miami Philip E.
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tors agree that the lawyer properly refused to change Mary's will without
making a disclosure to John.1 87
In Professor Shaffer's view, "[ilt follows from this typical analysis [on
the part of the commentators] that the lawyer's moral mistake was in
talking to Mary alone." ' If the lawyer had not talked to her alone, her
"secret intention never would have come to his attention; her thoughts
would be hidden, and that is appropriate because John's thoughts are
hidden." '89 Shaffer identifies four premises underlying the traditional
approach to legal ethics which these commentators exemplify:
First, a lawyer's proper employment is by or for an individual. Sec-
ond, employment by or for more than one individual is exceptional.
Third, as a consequence, multiple party employment is necessarily su-
perficial. Finally, the means for protecting the superficiality (or, if you
like, the means for protecting the principle that employment is ordina-
rily and properly by or for individuals) is ignorance of any facts known
to one of the individuals but not to the other.190
Shaffer suggests that these premises form the basis of "the legal ethics
of radical individualism." 19' Legal Ethics "looks on Mary as a collection
of interests and rights that begin and end in radical individuality."' '
John and Mary's family, their relationship to each other and their chil-
dren, are "seen as a product of individuality(!), of contract and consent,
of promises and the keeping of promises-all the consensual connections
that lonely individuals use when they want circumstantial harmony."' 3
The individuals who are in the family employ the lawyer as a result of
"promise and consent." The family is "relevant to the legal business at
hand only because the (radical) individuals, each in momentary and cir-
cumstantial harmony with one another, want it to be."' 94 This perspec-
tive, in turn, shapes how lawyers represent families. It suggests that
"[t]he things that people share... are relatively superficial; they are the
harmonies that radically autonomous individuals choose to have.""',
Therefore, "[e]mployment by a group of persons is possible only if the
lawyer stays with chosen harmonies. The employment is imperiled if the
Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan. 18-1, 18-29 (1991) [hereinafter Pennell, Professional
Responsibility] (under approach of no confidentiality between joint clients, "the attorney
escapes being in the middle of a terrible situation and essentially puts the monkey on the
back of the spouse with a secret").
187. See The Case of the Unwanted Will, supra note 15, at 484-88.
188. Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 969 (citation omitted).
189. Id
190. Id
191. Id at 970.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id Shaffer describes this moral perspective as one where "the highest good I can
seek for a person on whom I focus my beneficence is that he be free--and free here means
self-ruling and radically not committed." Id at 975.
195. Id at 975.
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lawyer intrudes on these individualistic choices."' 9 6 At the point where
"employment will necessarily intrude on these choices, then the radically
individualistic nature of the persons who are client(s) requires separate
lawyers for each individual."' 197
In light of this individualistic approach, Shaffer finds it "unlikely...
that the people who drafted and adopted the Model Rules would en-
courage a lawyer to exert herself to keep a client group together."' 98 In-
stead, "[t]he safer recourse, should fissures appear in the human
harmony that first allowed the lawyer to be lawyer for the group, is to
stand back, let things fall apart, and then take professional refuge from
the falling debris by withdrawing from the representation."'' 99 Indeed,
"had [Rule 2.2 as the Rule most favorable to group representation] been
invoked in The Case of the Unwanted Will, the lawyer would at any rate
have learned, as he protected himself from the debris, not to focus atten-
tion on a will-making wife in the absence of her husband. '' "°
Shaffer rejects this legal ethic of radical individualism as "sad, cor-
rupting, and untruthful."' '°  He argues that "this one-lawyer-for-each-
person way of first seeing a moral quandary in this situation and then
resolving the quandary with the ethics of autonomy (the ethics of alone-
ness) leaves the family out of the account. ' 20 2 The "truthful descrip-
tion," however, "is that the lawyer's employer is a family. '2 3 Indeed,
the family is an "organic community"' "' which is "prior to
individuality."20 5
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 974.
199. Id.
200. Id. Shaffer does, however, concede that Rule 2.2 is somewhat ambiguous and
potentially susceptible to an alternative construction. See id. at 972 & n.37.
201. Id. at 970.
202. Id.
203. Id. Shaffer notes that "[t]hose in contemporary ethics who concentrate on the
importance of the truthful account argue first that fact and value are not separate - that
stating the facts is, as Iris Murdoch put it, a moral act, a moral skill, and a moral art
.... " Id. at 965.
204. Id. at 970 n.26. Such "organic communities of persons are prior in life and in
culture to individuals-in other words .... the moral agent is not alone." Id. at 965-66
(footnote omitted). The term generally applies to three types of relationships:
First. - An organic community is created by people through the mutual
practice of the virtues, and through mutual support in the pursuit of the
good....
Second. - An organic community is created, sustained, and redeemed by
God....
Third. - An organic community is recognized by people who discover a
psychological or biological commonality in one another.
Id. at 965-66 n.8 (citations omitted). Shaffer asserts that the view of the family as an
"organic community" is consistent with our cultural and religious traditions. See id. at
970.
205. Id. at 971. Shaffer describes his perspective on the family as anthropological:
It is not normative, in the sense in which modern moral philosophy usually
separates the normative from the descriptive. The family is not, always and
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To illustrate the family as an "organic community," Shaffer uses au-
thor Anne Tyler's metaphor of "a magnifying glass all cracked and bro-
ken" that makes "broken things" appear "whole again."2 6 In Tyler's
cracked magnifying glass, even when physically alone, "all of us live[ ] in
a sort of web, criss-crossed by strings of love and need and worry.""27
Applying this understanding to The Case of the Unwanted Will, Shaffer
contends that "the family created the promises, the contract, the consent,
and the circumstantial harmony-not the other way around."2  In his
view, "[t]he family causes people to seek human harmonies and, conse-
quently, to create more families."2'9
Shaffer describes how families create the field of estate planning. The
family provides "the lens through which we understand death as the
death of an owner, and property as something owned by dead people."'2 1
It offers "the cracked magnifying glass that shows how things broken by
discord and death are whole."2" Indeed:
It]he family is normally why people bother with estate planning-'nor-
mally' in the sense that, but for the family, estate planning would not
be a legal subject. The family is the cultural focus for the realization
that estate planning is a worthwhile thing for people to do, because it
reflects the hope that none of us will die alone.
Shaffer concludes that "[tihe human fact that is prior to the moral
agency [that is, 'the capacity to make choices that determine one's char-
acter'] z13 of which moral philosophy usually speaks is the family; the
moral art of description in the legal ethics of estate planning is the skill to
describe a family." ' 4
Shaffer's approach differs in some ways from that of the established
doctrine. Shaffer's lawyer would actively seek information about the
family. This would include learning about potential differences, like the
established doctrine,"' but would also include, and indeed would em-
phasize, learning about the harmonies of the spousal relationship. This
activist approach differs from that of the commentators to The Case of
the Unwanted Will. Although established doctrine would not bar sepa-
everywhere, good teleologically; nor is it always and everywhere good for its
members. The family is part of the way people are.
Id at 972 n.35.
206. Id at 963 (quoting Anne Tyler, The Accidental Tourist 278-79 (1985)).
207. Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 966 (quoting Tyler, supra note 205, at
182).
208. Id. at 970.
209. Id at 971.
210. Id at 967.
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id
214. Id at n.14.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 76-92.
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rate meetings with John and Mary,2 16 the commentators suggested that
the lawyer, as a matter of prudent practice, should not have initiated a
separate conversation with Mary. Shaffer asserts that the lawyer's ac-
tivist approach of noticing that Mary was passive in discussion with the
lawyer and asking to speak with her alone, enabled the lawyer to learn
that Mary did not want to sign the will as drafted, The lawyer, therefore,
obtained "a more truthful description of the reality that is the goal of the
lawyer's work." '217 As Shaffer observes, "[i]f the lawyer had not talked to
Mary alone, he would not have learned that she didn't want her will. She
would still not have wanted it; the change would be that her lawyer
wouldn't know."218
After Mary conveys her desire to obtain a separate will, Shaffer identi-
fies only one of the options available under established doctrine as an
appropriate next step. The established doctrine permits (but does not
require) the lawyer to focus exclusively on differences between the
spouses and recommend separate representation. Shaffer rejects this ap-
proach because it would treat Mary "as a radical individual rather than
as a wife, a mother, and a member of a family." '219 Rather, Shaffer ap-
provingly describes how our "19th century forebears" would have re-
sponded: " 'The thing for Mary to do is to tell John what she's
thinking-or to tell me and let me tell him-and get this thing out in the
open and solve it. So that Mary gets the will she wants and John knows
about it.' ",220 This approach, while not the one taken by the commenta-
tors to The Case of the Unwanted Will, is not inconsistent with the legal
ethics codes.
What Shaffer would suggest if Mary refuses to consent to the disclo-
sure is less clear. Acknowledging that a family approach to ethics raises
"sticky and uncertain ' 22' issues, Shaffer suggests that lawyers adopt a
"paternalistic" approach that takes into account "the virtues of good
parents and the failures of bad parents. ' 222 Depending on the lawyer's
vision of a good parent, she might continue the representation believing
that to maintain the peace of the family she should accede to Mary's
216. See, e.g., Allegheny County Bar Op., supra note 48, at 30 ("Counsel should be
neither required nor precluded from meeting with the spouses jointly or separately.").
217. Id. at 978. See Shaffer, The Family as a client-Conflict or Community?, Res
Gestae, Oct. 1990, at 68 [hereinafter Family]. Shaffer asserts that "[t]he job of the lawyer
for the family properly includes the description, in the language that is the law, of what a
family knows, of what a family is, of what this family is." Shaffer, Individualism, supra
note 7, at 982.
218. Shaffer, Family, supra note 217, at 68. Professor Stephen Ellmann presents an
alternative explanation. He suggests that the lawyer might have been able to obtain the
same information by questioning Mary in John's presence and that "the lawyer's insis-
tence on separating the spouses is a form of disrespect for this couple as a couple."
Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1125.
219. Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 987.
220. Shaffer, Family, supra note 217, at 62.
221. Shaffer, Individualism, supra note 7, at 984.
222. Id. at 987. For the Article's analysis of this perspective, see infra part IV.
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approach and perhaps that the provisions of Mary's will were for the
best. Alternatively, she might decide that John and Mary's family is not
functioning properly and should not be represented further.
In the Nursing Home Hypothetical, Shaffer's approach would appear
to differ drastically from established doctrine. Where established doc-
trine strongly disfavors representing the spouses with conflicting inter-
ests, Shaffer places a much greater weight on their mutual intent to seek
the lawyer's aid in reaching an amicable resolution. Shaffer's vision of
legal ethics requires Mr. Lawyer to take the risk and represent Ozzie and
Harriet.
IV. THE REAL PROPERTY SECTION'S CHALLENGE TO ESTABLISHED
DOCTRINE: "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL
' 223
Although the Real Property Section's Recommendations" 4 purport to
be consistent with established doctrine, in fact, they represent a signifi-
cant departure. The Section grounds its recommendations on a pre-
sumption of spousal unity, facially similar to Shaffer's approach, and a
related goal of conforming legal ethics to client expectations. Contrary
to Shaffer's perspective, however, the Real Property Section's Recom-
mendations use these assumptions to propose a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
approach under which the lawyer can assume the absence of, and need
not inquire into, potential differences between spouses. When differences
emerge, such as confidences to be kept from one spouse, the Recommen-
dations take a much narrower view than the established doctrine in de-
termining when such differences implicate the lawyer's duty to disclose
and obtain consent, or withdraw. Under this narrow view, the lawyer
may in her discretion decide whether, and how to, withdraw or disclose
the confidence to the other spouse. Accordingly, the Recommendations
223. The phrase "don't ask, don't tell" has become a popular way to describe various
approaches, including President Clinton's, to the status of lesbian and gay members of
the military. Under the "don't ask, don't tell" approach, the military would as a matter
of policy exclude homosexuals from service but would not ask persons if they were
homosexual and would not investigate or "pursue" if they didn't "tell" by revealing their
sexuality on military premises. See e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Chiefs Back Clinton on
Gay-Troop Plan: President Admits Revised Policy Isn't Perfect, N.Y. Times, July 20,
1993, at Al.
224. The Real Property Section's Recommendations are the product of a two year
effort on the part of the Section's Study Committee on Professional Responsibility which
included distinguished practitioners and academics. See Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at
26. The leadership of the Section then approved the Recommendations. See Real Prop-
erty Section Council Resolution (May 2, 1993); Moore & Hilker, supra note 8. The Real
Property Section has not asked the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility or the ABA House of Delegates to approve the Recommendations or com-
ment on the issues they raise. See Comments of Anne K. Hilker & Jackson M. Bruce, Jr.,
"It's a Family Affair: Ethical Problems for Estate Planners," 19th National Conference
on Professional Responsibility (May 22, 1993). The Study Committee did correspond
with the drafters of the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers, but has refused to release that correspondence. See Letter from Malcolm A. Moore
to Russell G. Pearce, dated Aug. 17, 1993 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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embody a contradictory vision of the family which is both more and less
communitarian than established doctrine.
The Recommendations purport to provide guidance for practitioners
which is consistent with the legal ethics codes. 225 The Recommendations
seek to provide "a prescriptive guide to the serious ethics issues estate
planners routinely face '226 as a result of "inadequate guidance from the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and other available guide-
lines."' 221 Yet, the Recommendations do not seek either to make signifi-
cant changes in the existing legal ethics codes228 or to propose changes in
the established practice of trusts and estates lawyers.229
Despite the stated intent to conform to the legal ethics codes, the Rec-
ommendations propose major changes from established doctrine in both
joint and separate representation of spouses. These changes are based on
the Recommendations' two "working assumptions" for construction of
the legal ethics codes. 2' 0 First, the Recommendations instruct the lawyer
to "assume that each spouse will fulfill" the "ethical obligations of the
marriage commitment. ' 21  Second, the Recommendations advise con-
struing the ethical codes "to provide appropriate delivery of legal services
without excessive cost or duplication of services, and fulfillment of client
expectations about the lawyer's role whenever possible. ' ' 212  There
appears, however, to be an unstated third "working assumption" that
supports departures from established doctrine. This assumption seeks to
conform the Recommendations to the actual behavior of trusts and es-
tates practitioners. Evidence of this assumption is the divergence from
225. See Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at 26.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. The Real Property Section's Recommendations do suggest revising Rule
1.7 or its comment to read: "The status of marriage does not by itself create a material
risk that the representation of one spouse may be materially limited by the lawyer's re-
sponsibilities to the other spouse for purposes of Rule 1.7." Real Property Section's Rec-
ommendations, supra note 8, at vii n.12.
229. For example, while the Recommendations state that agreements regarding the
contours of the representation and discussions of potential differences to be preferable,
they reject the idea that such agreements are necessary for ethical practice. Moore &
Hilker, supra note 8, at 27-28; Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8,
at 19.
230. Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 8.
231. Id. at 8. The Real Property Section's Recommendations state that "husbands and
wives, by virtue of their marriage commitment, have certain rights and obligations be-
tween themselves." Id. at 7. While the Recommendations do not detail these "rights and
obligations," they mention that "[s]ome states have codified a fiduciary obligation of hus-
bands and wives to each other in transactions relating to, and disclosure of the property
of, each spouse." Id. at 8. Lawyers who assume that "the spouses' behavior will fail to
honor that commitment.., risk undermining the ethical structure and importance of the
marriage itself." Id. at 7-8 (emphasis omitted). The premise underlying this view is
apparently that "'[a]dversarial juxtaposition in estate planning matters can ...spark
marital discord even to the extent, in extreme cases, of encouraging resort to the ultimate
weapon in this adversary relationship-divorce.'" Id. at 7 n.7 (quoting Allegheny
County Bar Op., supra note 48).
232. Id. at 7.
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established doctrine discussed below and the criticism of that doctrine
found in a recent article by two members of the Recommendations'
drafting committee. These authors find that "the bulk of [trust and es-
tates practitioners in their survey] do not engage in conduct that the writ-
ers for the ethics rules regard as mandatory to avoid an ethics
violation." '233 Rather than urge compliance with ethics rules, they
conclude:
It is not likely that 75 percent of all estate planners who responded to
this survey are in fact unethical, which may indicate that the rules are
not in tune with reality, and there appears to be no empirical evidence
that the rules need to, or should, dictate conduct that is so deviant
from reality.234
Perhaps the Recommendations are intended to remedy this "deviance."
The following analysis identifies specific differences between the Rec-
ommendations and established doctrine. Even though the Recommenda-
tions claim to use these assumptions only where the ethical codes are
unclear, they in fact employ them contrary to established doctrine with
regard to the lawyer's duty to inquire regarding conflicts, to obtain in-
formed consent in conflict situations, and to withdraw where conflicts are
unconsented or where conflicts will adversely impact the representation.
A. No Duty to Inquire
Contrary to authority that lawyers should inquire into possible differ-
ences between joint clients,23 the Recommendations suggest generally
that the lawyer need make no inquiry because she should presume "the
couple [is] unified in goals and interests until shown otherwise. ''f6 This
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach is also consistent with an assumption
of cost effectiveness and client expectations which favors joint representa-
tion "if the need for separate counsel is not clear."237
The Recommendations' approach to the duty to inquire in separate
simultaneous representation is less clear. Although the Recommenda-
tions require an "agreement" before commencing such representation,
which presumably indicates informed consent under Rule 1.7, the Rec-
ommendations provide little guidance as to the inquiry the lawyer should
make and the content of the necessary agreement. 3 8
233. Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Practicing What le Preach: Esoteric or
Essential? 27 U. Miami Philip E. Heckerling Inst. on Est. Planning C 12-10 (1993).
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 24,
§ 7.3.4 (lawyer should as a "first step.., identify whether a conflict exists [by] identifying
at the outset of the representation the legal and other interests that the several clients
have and that they may wish to assert or seriously consider as the transaction proceeds").
236. Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 8.
237. Id. at 7.
238. See id. at 16.
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B. No General Duty to Obtain Consent to Joint Representation
Although established doctrine generally requires lawyers to obtain in-
formed consent to joint spousal representation,239 the Recommendations
reject the need for informed consent absent specific evidence of differ-
ences. 2 ' The established doctrine apparently relies on the numerous po-
tential differences between spouses in estate planning.24" ' In contrast, the
Recommendations permit the lawyer to avoid informed consent by
presuming marital unity absent specific evidence to the contrary. 242
C. A Higher Threshold for Applying Rule 1. 7 to Joint Representation
Under established doctrine,243 differences in spousal objectives regard-
ing apportionment of bequests or how to balance tax benefits and the
survivor's control of the estate, would certainly implicate Rule 1.7(b)
and, depending on the nature of the differences, might even present direct
adversity under Rule 1.7(a). The Recommendations, however, assert
that differences regarding such objectives do not implicate the require-
239. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91; see, e.g., Restatement Governing Law-
yers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. c & illus. 1 (noting that lawyer must obtain informed
consent to represent spouses with "common preferences ... consult[ing] a Lawyer for
estate planning advice and drafting of reciprocal wills" because "there is a substantial risk
that the lawyer's representation of one or more of the clients would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to one or more of the other clients").
240. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 7-10. The Rec-
ommendations attempt to distinguish the Restatement's position on the ground that its
illustration of spouses seeking representation for estate planning "refers to the lawyer's
role in intermediation to achieve a contractual commitment, requiring a single lawyer to
achieve a binding, guaranteed result," and not generally to spousal representation. Id. at
11 n.16. However, as the Recommendations implicitly acknowledge, the Restatement's
use of the term "reciprocal" does not appear to be limited to such contractual commit-
ments. See id. In any event, the potential for actual or potential differences in objectives
can be just as great for binding as non-binding reciprocal wills. The only major distinc-
tion between these wills is that the binding reciprocal will is more difficult to change.
Further evidencing that it is not limited to binding reciprocal wills, the Restatement's
illustration refers to "estate planning" as well as reciprocal wills. See Restatement Gov-
erning Lawyers, supra note 28, at illus. 1.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
242. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 8-9 ("joint repre-
sentation [of spouses] may proceed without prior discussion of the rules of the representa-
tion absent an existing conflict or evidence that the lawyer's independent professional
judgment is likely to be adversely affected by the representation") (citing In re Samuels
and Weiner, 674 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Or. 1983)). Nowhere does the opinion upon which the
Recommendations rely ever suggest any presumption against informed consent. In that
case, the court found informed consent unnecessary because there was "no evidence that
... suggests that there either was an existing conflict of interest or that the accuseds'
independent professional judgment was or likely would be adversely affected by the em-
ployment." In re Samuels and Weiner, 674 P.2d at 1171. Moreover, that case arose in a
business, and not a family, context. Its result is contrary to much authority directly on
point to family representation. See supra part II. Indeed, the Allegheny County Bar Op.,
see supra note 48, upon which the Recommendations rely to create the assumption of
spousal unity, Real Property Section's Recommendations, see supra note 8, at 7 n.7, re-
quires informed consent before all spousal representation in estate planning.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
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ments of Rule 1.7.2"
In addition, although established doctrine would include under Rule
1.7(b) any potential differences regarding goals of the representation, 245
the Recommendations generally exempt "different choices made by each
spouse with respect to his or her own assets" from the differences which
implicate the conflicts rules.2  Such a conflict arises only where
"spouses disagree on issues in which only one spouse can succeed, such
as ownership rights or the characterization of property as separate or
community, or where the exercise of a forced share right will defeat the
other spouse's intended plan. 247
The Recommendations take a similar approach to the conflicts impli-
cations of one spouse asking the lawyer to keep a confidence from the
other. While acknowledging that some confidences implicate Rule 1.7,
the Recommendations take a narrower view than the established doc-
trine. The Recommendations do acknowledge that "adverse" confi-
dences will implicate Rule 1.7(a) if one spouse asks a lawyer to take an
action that "would reduce or defeat the other spouse's interest in the
confiding spouse's property or pass the confiding spouse's property to
another. '248 Such a request would "indicate[ ] substantial potential of
material harm to the interests of the other spouse, "249 or inform the law-
yer "that the expectations of one spouse with respect to the plan, or the
spouse's understanding of the facts on which the plan is based, are not
true. '250 Contrary, however, to established doctrine which requires the
lawyer to disclose all relevant information to the client,25" the Recom-
mendations assert that confidences regarding extra-marital relationships,
significant hidden assets, and the strength of the marriage would not nec-
essarily implicate Rule 1.7.252 The Recommendations suggest that such
"non-adverse" confidences implicate Rule 1.7(b) only if they "define[ ] or
exchange[] ... [marital rights,]... defeat[ ] the other spouse's rights[, or]
244. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 9-10.
245. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
246. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 10.
247. Id at 10.
248. Id at 12 (emphasis omitted).
249. Id (emphasis omitted) (ag., where "a lawyer has recommended spousal gifts to
equalize estates and the donee spouse confides that he or she plans a divorce immediately
after receiving the gift").
250. Id at 13 (emphasis omitted).
251. See supra note 113.
252. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 13 (suggesting
such disclosures "may range from earnest disclosures to joking exclamations" and that a
"disclosure about the strength of the marriage, such as a statement of intent to divorce, if
no marital rights are defined or exchanged, is not one that defeats the other spouse's
rights, nor any expectation about the operation of the plan"). It would, however, be hard
to imagine a circumstance where a lawyer would not reasonably believe that a client
engaged in estate planning would not want this information. Cf Monroe County Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 87-2 (1987) (where spouses are joint plaintiffs in personal
injury suit, husband's disclosure of intent to divorce wife implicates conflicts rules).
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any expectations about the operation of the plan. 253
Whether resulting from confidences or not, differences that implicate
Rule 1.7 must rise to a higher level under the Recommendations than
under established doctrine. The Recommendations reach this approach
from an unusually high standard of materiality,254 the assumption of
spousal unity which minimizes the threat of actual or potential differ-
ences,255 and a view that if one spouse has no legal right to property of
the other, differences regarding that property are irrelevant.25 6
D. An Even Higher Threshold for Applying Rule 1. 7 to Separate
Simultaneous Representation.
In ambiguous language, and contrary to established doctrine, the Rec-
ommendations establish a conflicts threshold for separate simultaneous
representation 257 that is even higher than that for joint representation.
On one hand, the Recommendations effectively read Rule 1.7(b)'s limi-
tations out of separate representation by noting that conflicts analysis is
not implicated "until the parties' interests actually become adverse."'2 5
Similarly, unlike joint representation, "adverse confidences" alone259 or
"[c]hanges in the estate plan that alter the other spouse's interest, revoca-
tions of matching bequests, and changes to formerly reciprocal plans'" 2
°
do not require the application of conflicts doctrine unless "actual adver-
sity" results.26 On the other hand, the Recommendations also provide
that Rule 1.7(b) would apply to separate representation if actual or po-
tential differences would impair the lawyer's independent judgment.262
The Recommendations' explanation of the distinction in treatment be-
tween joint and separate representation is confusing. The Recommenda-
tions argue that "[b]ecause the lawyer's exposure to conflicting interests
253. Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 13.
254. The Recommendations use language that Rule 1.7(b) applies only where "the
lawyer discerns that there is a substantial potential for a material limitation upon the
lawyer's representation of either spouse" to create this high standard. Real Property
Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasis omitted). On the other hand,
the Recommendations expressly borrow this language from the Restatement, See id.;
which finds a potential material limit in all cases of joint spousal representation in estate
planning. Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 211 cmt. c.
255. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 7-8.
256. See id. at 9-10.
257. In joint representation, the lawyer represents the spouses together "to accomplish
a mutual goal." Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 4. In sepa-
rate representation, "each spouse is a separate client, entitled separately to the lawyer's
counsel for his or her own interest." Id.
258. Id. at 16.
259. Id. at 18-19.
260. Id. at 17.
261. Id. at 16, 18. The Real Property Section's Recommendations offer as examples of
"directly adverse," id. at 10, or "truly adverse," id. at 16, representations "the assertion
of differing rights to assets, concealment of assets belonging to the other spouse, or the
active deception of the other spouse." Id. at 16.
262. See id. at 18.
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is greater in a joint representation than in a separate representation, the
lawyer will sooner reach the threshold of conflict., 2 3 Perhaps the Rec-
ommendations also treat separate representation differently because they
require some unspecified form of conflict waiver before commencing sep-
arate, but not joint, representation, and therefore these differences have
been waived in advance of their occurrence.2" Yet the Recommenda-
tions also concede that "[t]he Model Rules provide the same analysis of
the need for a conflict waiver in joint and separate representations."26
Although Rule 1.7 might apply differently to situations where actual
or potential differences arise after a conflict waiver,2 6 established doc-
trine would not set a higher threshold for separate as opposed to joint
representation. If the same rules apply, the same factual evidence of a
conflict based on actual or potential differences would have the same im-
plications for the need for consent to representation.
Indeed, to the extent established doctrine distinguishes between joint
and separate representation, it tolerates more differences in joint repre-
sentation. The commitment to common interests underlying a decision
to seek and continue representation would be a factor weighing in favor
of continuing representation in the face of direct adversity or a material
limitation.2 6 In addition, although established doctrine suggests that the
requirements of Rule 1.7(b) and Rule 2.2 are similar,2 68 a reasonable ar-
gument exists that a lawyer should have greater discretion under Rule
2.2 to act as a "lawyer for the situation" in seeking to reconcile divided
interests.269
E. Giving Lawyers Greater Discretion to Disclose Confidences or Avoid
Withdrawal
While established doctrine requires a lawyer to withdraw from repre-
sentation where a conflict arises27 0 and probably to protect the confi-
dences of one spouse from the other, absent an agreement to the
263. Ide at 5 (emphasis omitted).
264. See id at 6, 16.
265. Id at 5. See also id at 4-5, 10 (discussing conflicts and conflict waivers in joint
representation).
266. See Restatement Governing Lawyers, supra note 28, § 202 cmts. d, f.
267. For example, the Restatement provides:
Even if the possibility of litigation is substantial at the outset of the representa-
tion, and even though consent would not permit the lawyer to represent all
parties if litigation should result .... a lawyer could accept multiple representa-
tion in an effort to reconcile the differences of the clients short of litigation.
Id. § 211 cmt. d. Of course, the failure to consent to disclosure of a confidence that
implicates Rules 1.7(a) or (b) prevents continued representation because consent could
not be obtained without disclosure. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7 cmt.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
269. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 2.2:103. For example, Rule 2.2's test of
resolution "compatible with the clients' best interests" perhaps suggests a greater empha-
sis on common interests over existing or potential differences than Rule 1.7(b) which
would clearly look at the adverse effect on the representation of the individual.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
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contrary,271 the Recommendations provide a lawyer with significant dis-
cretion to delay withdrawal27 2 or to disclose the confidence which creates
a conflict.2 73 Under the Recommendations, if confidences rise to the
level of creating a conflict under Rule 1.7(a)274 or Rule 1.7(b),2 75 the
lawyer should apply a balancing test in deciding whether to disclose or
withdraw. If the lawyer finds that "the potential for harm from failure to
disclose is ... greater [than the harm of disclosure]," the lawyer should,
but need not, disclose the confidence even without the confiding spouse's
consent.276 If the confiding spouse does not consent to the disclosure, the
lawyer may disclose and must eventually withdraw,277 but also must
"balance... the potential for material harm arising from an unexpected
withdrawal against the potential for material harm arising from failure to
disclose the confidence" 27 in determining whether to delay withdrawal
"for the short term" in order "to prevent disclosure" resulting from the
withdrawal.279 In apparent contradiction to this balancing test, the Rec-
ommendations also state that "[i]n no case may the lawyer act upon the
confidence to the detriment of the other spouse" and that "the lawyer
must withdraw at the first reasonable opportunity. 28 °
F. Applying the Real Property Section's Recommendations
The Recommendations' approach to the Estate Hypothetical differs
from that of established doctrine. Applying the presumption of spousal
unity, Ms. Lawyer could represent John and Mary jointly, without any
27 1. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
272. In contrast to permissive withdrawal where a lawyer must consider "if with-
drawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client,"
Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.16(b), mandatory withdrawal, such as where contin-
ued employment would violate Rule 1.7, see Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.7 cmt.;
Rule 1.16(a)(1), includes no such consideration. In all withdrawals, however, "a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests." See
Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.16(d). While these steps include ministerial steps
such as "giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned," id., they do not contemplate
delaying withdrawal where it results in the lawyer violating the rules.
273. Asserting that "authority is scant and offers little analytical guidance," Real
Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at ix n.20, the Recommendations
concede that "available ruling authority-itself founded on client expectations-points
toward the conclusion that a lawyer is not required to disclose an adverse confidence to
the other spouse." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). Indeed, while the weight of authority
requires confidentiality, the minority authority favors a full waiver of confidentiality, not
the balancing test the Recommendations propose. See supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
274. See Real Property Section's Recommendations, supra note 8, at 14-16.
275. See id. at 18-19.
276. See id. at 14.
277. Id. at 14-15.
278. Id. at 15.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis omitted).
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discussion of potential differences, or separately, based on an agreement.
Mary's request for a separate and different will probably does not require
either disclosure or withdrawal unless it presents an "adversarial" confi-
dence.281 If it does, Ms. Lawyer will have to apply the balancing test to
determine whether to disclose or withdraw.282 The Recommendations
define Rule 2.2 so narrowly as to be inapplicable to the Estate
Hypothetical.283
In the Nursing Home Hypothetical, the Recommendations would ap-
pear to vary little from the established doctrine. Despite the presump-
tion of spousal unity, Ozzie and Harriet's directly adverse interests would
bar joint or separate representation.
The Recommendations therefore present a rather complex and incon-
sistent perspective on the family. They start with a presumption of
spousal unity284 which certainly appears to recognize family as a commu-
nity. Indeed, application of the presumption furthers a communitarian
perspective by permitting representation of families in situations where
established doctrine would forbid it.2" 5
In contrast to this communitarian perspective are the Recommenda-
tions's significant individualistic aspects. They stretch restrictions on di-
rect adversity and material limitations on representation but do not reject
them as Shaffer's approach conceivably does.2" 6 Mr. Lawyer could not
represent Ozzie and Harriet under the Recommendations. 8 7
In other areas, the Recommendations are more individualistic than es-
tablished doctrine. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach permits a
lawyer to avoid engaging family members about issues which are impor-
tant to them in ways that established doctrine would require.288 The
Recommendations' creation of a special conflicts category for separate
281. See supra text accompanying notes 236-56.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 270-79.
283. The Recommendations are somewhat misleading in their assertion that "Rule 2.2
only rarely applies to the representation of spouses," Real Property Section's Recommen-
dations, supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis omitted), such as where "the couple seeks to guar-
antee reciprocity or binding mirror image wills, or concludes an agreement exchanging or
modifying spousal rights." Id at 11, 16-17. The Recommendations assert that "the law-
yer is not intermediating to achieve a common goal" in a situation where "spouses seek to
dispose of their own assets in ways that conform with any applicable minimum forced
share requirements." Id at 11. This analysis appears to rest on a narrow reading of the
statement in the comment to Rule 2.2 that "[a] lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to
establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advanta-
geous basis." Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2 cmt. However, estate planning for
spouses, even where they have separate assets and conform to minimum forced share
requirements, creates or adjusts relations between them on both a legal and emotional
level. Moreover, the comment to Rule 2.2 expressly provides that it applies to situations,
like estate planning, "when the lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially
conflicting interests." Id.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 224-29.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 239-56.
286. See supra part III.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 283-84.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 235-38.
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simultaneous representation permits lawyers to undermine the family
unit by helping spouses treat each other as separate individuals, take ac-
tions that are not in the family's interest, and keep confidences from each
other.28 9 Furthermore, the Recommendations' narrow understanding of
where actual and potential differences implicate conflicts doctrine2 90 im-
plies a vision of family members as almost purely atomistic. For exam-
ple, to assert that one spouse has no interest in how the other spouse
disposes of her own assets291 is to view the spouses as totally separate
individuals without a common familial interest in how each member of
the community disposes of their assets. Similarly, to assert that secret
marital infidelity or the intent to obtain a divorce might not potentially
create differences between spouses292 is to write the fact of their relation-
ship out of their representation.
Accordingly, the challenge of the Recommendations to established
doctrine, while expressly grounded in an understanding of the family as a
unit, actually is both more individualistic and more communitarian than
established doctrine.
V. A NEW LEGAL ETHIC FOR REPRESENTING FAMILIES
This Part examines how best to represent families. It proposes permit-
ting families the option of deciding whether to obtain representation as a
family or as a collection of individuals. Part V.A. distinguishes between
Optional Family Representation and other alternatives. Part V.B. ex-
plains the advantages Optional Family Representation offers. Part V.C.
acknowledges the potential problems of Optional Family Representation
and offers methods for minimizing these problems. Part V.D. suggests
revisions in either Rules 1.13 or 2.2 that would be necessary to permit
Optional Family Representation. Part V.E. applies Optional Family
Representation to a number of hypothetical situations.
A. Optional Family Representation Distinguished From Alternative
Approaches
Optional Family Representation allows family members to determine
how they will be represented. It provides them with the option of choos-
ing representation as a collection of individuals under established con-
flicts rules or as a family group.2 93 Within the family group, Optional
289. See Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 141-44; supra text accompanying
notes 257-69.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 243-56.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. As a definition of the term "group," this Article relies on Professor Clayton Al-
derfer's description of a human group:
a collection in individuals: a) who have significantly interdependent relations
with each other; b) who perceive themselves as a group by reliably distinguish-
ing members from non-members; c) whose group identity is recognized by non-
members; d) who have differentiated roles in the group as a function of expecta-
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Family Representation protects the ability of each family member to ob-
tain the information relevant to, and participate equally in, all decisions,
including the option to withdraw from the family representation at any
time.
Optional Family Representation contrasts with four other alternatives.
One, the Real Property Section approach inconsistently applies commu-
nitarian and individualist approaches without a principled ground for
such distinctions. 294 Two, from an extreme individualist perspective,
legal ethics could view family members only as individuals and require
that each family member obtain separate representation in all circum-
stances. Three, from the other extreme, legal ethics could define the fam-
ily exclusively as an organic whole and require representation of the
family as a unit in all circumstances. Four, between these two extremes
is the established doctrine. While treating family members fundamen-
tally as individuals, it acknowledges that some group identity exists. Es-
tablished doctrine permits representation of the family as a unit in the
limited circumstances where the individuals and their lawyer determine
that the individuals' differing interests are unlikely to adversely affect the
representation.295
Optional Family Representation is in some ways similar to the estab-
lished doctrine. Both perspectives understand families as simultaneously
having group and individual aspects. Both also require lawyers to ensure
that family members are aware of the impact of group representation on
their individual interests and that family members have the opportunity,
if they choose, to refuse or withdraw from group representation, and seek
separate individual representation.
Despite these similarities, Optional Family Representation differs from
the established doctrine in significant ways. Optional Family Represen-
tation permits families greater lattitude to require the lawyer to respect
the group aspect of the family unit. Accordingly, Optional Family Rep-
resentation permits representation of families as groups even where es-
tablished doctrine would bar such representation because the lawyer
tion from themselves, other members and non-groups; and e) who as group
members acting alone or in concert have significantly interdependent relations
with other groups.
Leroy Wells, Jr., The Group-as-a- Whole: A Systemic Socio-Analytic Perspective on Inter-
personal and Group Relations, in 2 Advances in Experiential Social Processes 165, 166 (C.
P. Alderfer & C. I. Cooper eds., 1980) (quoting Alderfer). This Article will distinguish
between the "group" and "individual" aspects of the family. In terms of legal representa-
tion, this Article will use the term group when the lawyer represents the family as a group
or entity, as opposed to individuals who have joint representation. This usage contrasts
with an earlier usage in the debate regarding representation of organizations. In discus-
sions during the enactment of the Model Rules the term entity referred to representation
of the organization as an entity and the term group referred to representation of the
organization as a collection of individuals. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, 231-37,
244.
294. See supra part IV.
295. See supra part II.
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objectively determines that it would pose risks to the individual family
members. Moreover, while established doctrine requires lawyers to focus
on family disharmonies,296 Optional Family Representation encourages
lawyers also to pay attention to family harmonies. The details of Op-
tional Family Representation are discussed further below.
B. Why Optional Family Representation is Preferable
This section explains why Optional Family Representation's balance of
the individual and group aspects of the family is preferable to that of
established doctrine. Only Optional Family Representation permits rep-
resentation of both the harmonies and disharmonies of families who
choose it, while protecting the free choices of individual family members.
The arguments favoring Optional Family Representation, however, also
provide the grounds to reject requiring individual representation of each
family member. The liberal2 97 and communitarian 298 arguments for hav-
ing family members choose the form of representation, as well as the
problems with group representation discussed in Part IV.C., make Op-
tional Family Representation preferable to required family
representation.
Many perspectives on the family support Optional Family Representa-
tion's approach of simultaneously valuing the group aspect of the family
and protecting the individual's ability to reject or withdraw from the
group. Family therapy perspectives, for example, emphasize attending to
both the group and individual aspects of the family. Additionally,
Professors Karpel and Strauss note that in "family system theory:"
individuals are not unrelated atoms that are motivated only by internal
urges and instincts, but ... are parts of larger systems which exert
considerable influence on their thoughts, feelings and actions. Never-
theless, even in the language of system theory, individuals are also
whole systems with internal dynamics which mediate their reactions to
systems forces.299
Similarly, Professor Nichols argues "that ignoring the subjective experi-
ence and private motivations of individual family members could be as
limiting as ignoring the effect of family interactional patterns."3 °°
As in family therapy, the field of organizational behavior supplies an
understanding that a family, like other groups, has a group identity that
transcends the individual identities of family members. Professor Leroy
Wells, for example, describes the "group-as-a-whole" perspective in
296. See supra part II.
297. This Part uses "liberal" and "individualist" interchangeably. For a discussion of
liberalism, see supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
298. This part uses the "communitarian" label to refer to perspectives that support
viewing the family as a community or group, rather than a collection of individuals.
299. Mark A. Karpel & Eric S. Strauss, Family Evaluation 14 (1983).
300. Michael Nichols, The Individual in the System, Networker, Mar.-Apr. 1987, at
33, 36.
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which a group is both "more and less than the sum total of the individual
co-actors (members) and... has a life of its own distinct from but related
to the dynamics of the co-actors who comprise the group
membership."30 1
Observers of the family, from the perspectives of social science and
law, note that while families in general have become more individualistic
and less organic, many families retain a communitarian character.302
Professor Mary Ann Glendon finds that "most men and women still
spend most of their lives in emotionally and economically interdependent
family units."30 3 Sociologist Father Andrew Greeley, analyzing data re-
garding American families, concludes that for many:
[t]he marriage bond between a man and a woman is more than a legal
contract, though it may begin with a contract and involve the continu-
ation of a contract through the life together. It is a union of minds and
bodies, not union in the romantic or ideal sense, but rather as that
which occurs in the hard reality of everyday life. , 31
A number of religious sources similarly support valuing the group as-
pect of families. Significant Jewish and Christian sources 30 5 assert that
while spouses have individual identities,30 6 their relationship creates a
distinct and merged entity. These sources often rely on the teaching of
Genesis that spouses "shall be one flesh. ' 3 ' The eminent Twentieth
Century Jewish thinker Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik observed that
"[m]arriage is not a utilitarian transaction, a partnership agreement, a
casual relationship. It is an existential commitment, a uniting of two
lonely, incomplete souls to share a common destiny with its joys and
sorrows .... It is a metaphysical fusion.1 308 Similarly, Pope John Paul
301. Wells, supra note 293, at 169. See also Clayton P. Alderfer & David A. Thomas,
The Significance of Race and Ethnicity for Understanding Organizational Behavior, 1988
Int. Rev. of Indust. Org. Psychol. 1, 6 (1988).
302. See Bellah et al., supra note 136, at 89-90; Glendon, the New Family, supra note
132, at 3-4; Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 121 (1985).
303. Glendon, Transformation, supra note 131, at 312.
304. Andrew M. Greeley, Faithful Attraction: Discovering Intimacy, Love, and Fidel-
ity in American Marriage 240 (1991).
305. These examples are used as illustrations of particular perspectives and are not
intended to exhaust Jewish or Christian perspectives, or to represent the totality of reli-
gious perspectives, many of which are neither Jewish nor Christian.
306. See, eg., IX New Catholic Encyclopedia 267 (1967) (spouses "'must always re-
spect the incommunicable and irreducible individuality of the other, for.., man and wife
are and remain not identical, but complementary beings' ) (quoting M. M. Philipon, The
Sacraments in the Christian Life (1954)).
307. Genesis 2:24 (Jewish Publication Society).
308. Joseph B. Soloveitchik & Abraham R. Besdin, Reflections of the Ray 121-22
(1979). For other Jewish sources, see, e.g., 1 Samson Raphael Hirsch, The Pentateuch:
Genesis 69 (Issac Levy Trans. 1959) ("Man and Woman become one single body. But
that can only take place if at the same time they become one mind, one heart, one soul,
and this again is only possible if they subordinate all their strength and efforts, all their
thoughts and desires to the service of a higher will."); I Sforno, Commentary on the
Torah 27 (Mesorah 1987) ("In all their actions they will aim to attain the perfection
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II has written that " 'there is no separation between [spouses] in spirit or
flesh; in fact they are truly two in one flesh, and where the flesh is one,
one is the spirit.' " An example of a corresponding Protestant per-
spective is that of the eminent theologian Karl Barth. He describes
"[m]arriage as a life-partnership" where "two should become one body
in the comprehensive sense of the New Testament. '310
In most of these religious perspectives, while the group aspect of the
family predominates, the individual identity of family members remains.
The New Catholic Encyclopedia, for example, explains that spouses
"'must always respect the incommunicable and irreducible individuality
of the other; for . . . man and wife are and remain not identical, but
complementary beings.' "311
Communitarian philosophical perspectives also support valuing the
group aspect of families. Professor Michael Sandel, for example, rejects
the notion that the individual self is "epistemologically prior as well as
morally prior[, that w]e are distinct individuals first, and then we form
relationships. ' 31 2 He asserts that for members of a society "community
describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they
are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association) but an
attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of
their identity. 31 3
Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre similarly notes that "I am someone's
son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or
that city, a member of this or that guild profession. "'34 As a result, "the
self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in com-
munities such as those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city and the
tribe., 31s
A communal understanding of the family favors Optional Family Rep-
intended by man's creation, as though the two were only as one (flesh)."). See also Mar-
tin Buber, I and Thou 95 (Walter Kaufman trans. 1970) ("Marriage can never be re-
newed except by that which is always the source of all true marriage: that two human
beings reveal the You to one another. It is of this that the You that is I for neither of
them builds a marriage.").
309. Pope John Paul II, The Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World 25
(1981) (quoting Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, II, VIII, 6-8: CCL, 1, 393).
310. III Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation 189-90 (G. W.
Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds. 1961).
311. IX New Catholic Encyclopedia, supra note 306, at 267 (quoting M. M. Philipon,
The Sacraments in the Christian Life (1954)); see also Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Way
in Love and Marriage 162 (1980) ("The form, the contract and the process are contrac-
tual. The context, the bond, and the resulting relationship are covenantal.").
312. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 133 (1982).
313. Id. at 150.
314. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 204-05 (1981).
315. Alasdair Maclntyre, The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a
Tradition 125, 143, in Liberalism and its Critics (Michael Sandel ed. 1984). Maclntyre
acknowledges that the self has the capacity to move beyond "the moral limitations of the
particularity of those forms of [the] community ... [in] the search for the good, for the
universal." Id.
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resentation over all alternatives except mandatory family representation.
While a communal perspective might support requiring family represen-
tation, it could also favor Optional Family Representation as best pro-
tecting a family's choices. Optional Family Representation allows
families, and not the legal profession, to decide how to represent them.
In so doing, it respects the choices of a family as a community and mini-
mizes the legal profession's intrusion into the family.
The alternatives to Optional Family Representation do not permit the
family to determine the scope of its representation. Under either
mandatory family or individual representation, established doctrine, or
the Real Property Section approach, the legal profession defines for fami-
lies how lawyers will represent them. Mandatory individual representa-
tion defines family members solely as individuals, while established
doctrine treats them predominantly as individuals.316 Mandatory family
representation requires families to obtain representation as a community.
The Real Property Section's Recommendations assume that spouses are
a "unity" for some purposes and atomistic individuals for others.3 17
From the perspective of the individual, rather than the family unit, a
liberal approach that values the individual choices of family members3t
would also favor Optional Family Representation. Such a liberal ap-
proach would allow family members to choose whether to be represented
as individuals or as a family unit. Family members would be like any
other group of persons who sought representation as a group rather than
as joint individuals.
Professor Monroe Freedman observes that if legal ethics values indi-
vidual autonomy "the affected clients should have the power to waive
conflicts of interest, as long as the clients act voluntarily and with full
knowledge of all of the risks of the conffict."31 9 He notes that he "cannot
think of any conflict of interest that should not be waivable, as long as
the judgment can fairly be made that the client had a complete under-
standing of the risks and made a voluntary decision to accept the risks
that come with the particular lawyer."3 ' A liberal perspective would
require only consent and would remove from the legal ethics codes the
test of the lawyer's objective determination of the propriety of the
representation.3 2
Applying this approach to families would permit family members to
waive conflicts and obtain representation as a family unit, much like any
316. See supra part II.
317. See supra part IV.
318. A liberal paternalistic approach that doubts the ability of individuals to make free
and informed choices regarding family representation would pose a challenge to Optional
Family Representation. See infra part V.C.4.
319. Freedman, supra note 25, at 182.
320. Id. at 182-83. He further suggests that a lawyer should be wary of representing
clients who have waived conflicts where the circumstances suggest potential future expo-
sure for the lawyer. Ma. at 183.
321. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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other group of persons. Indeed, Professor Stephen Ellmann has observed
that "[p]eople's membership in groups is often itself an expression of
their individual autonomy[, including the choice] to become husbands or
wives. "322
While protecting the family members' choice of group representation,
Optional Family Representation also protects the individual family mem-
ber's right to make an informed choice to reject or leave family represen-
tation. In so doing, it accords with a liberal understanding of the family.
Professor Jeremy Waldron, for example, has defended the law's individu-
alistic approach to the family on the ground that it "provide[s] each per-
son with secure knowledge of what she can count on in the unhappy
event that there turns out to be no other basis for her dealings with her
erstwhile partner in the relationship" and benefits society and individuals
by permitting the development of new relationships.323 Acknowledging
that "we live in and for communities of one sort or another most of the
time," Waldron observes that a legal system that focuses on the rights of
individuals as "fall-backs" provides individuals with a "vantage point"
for scrutiny of these communities.324
Optional Family Representation ensures that the individual continu-
ally has both information regarding the implications of the representa-
tion for her individual interests and the ability to withdraw. This
guarantee provides the individual with the freedom to alter her relation-
ships and a "fall-back" if family representation is not satisfactory. 325
The final advantages of Optional Family Representation are related to
legal practice.326 In at least three ways, family representation is prefera-
ble to individual representation. First are financial considerations. One
lawyer for a family is of course more affordable than a lawyer for each
member of the family.327 Questions of affordability are especially impor-
tant in light of the difficulties persons of low and moderate means face in
obtaining legal services.328
Second is the dynamics of the legal representation. One lawyer can
better facilitate an amicable resolution of family issues than multiple law-
yers. 329 Lawyers for individuals will seek to maximize that individual's
322. Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1123.
323. Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 625, 629 (1988).
324. Id. at 645.
325. Part V.C. responds to arguments that, especially in light of gender inequality,
Optional Family Representation fails to protect adequately the rights of individual family
members.
326. Potential disadvantages in legal representation are discussed infra at Part V.C.
327. See, e.g., John R. Price, Price on Contemporary Estate Planning § 1.14.3 1992
(discussing Rule 2.2 and reduction of attorney's fees); Restatement Governing Lawyers,
supra note 28, § 201 (noting that because of the costs imposed by prohibitions of conflicts
such prohibitions should be no "broader than necessary).
328. See N. Y.S. Bar Association Committee on Legal Aid: The New York Legal Needs
Study (rev. 1993).
329. See Allegheny County Bar Op., supra note 48, at 28.
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position."' 0 While multiple lawyers could take non-adversarial ap-
proaches to such representation, prevailing professional norms place lim-
its on how non-adversarial a lawyer's thinking will be. Professor Monroe
Freedman observes that "any lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on
a client's behalf, or drafts a legal document for a client must do so with
an actual or potential adversary in mind."3'' In contrast, a lawyer for
the family will seek to do what is best for the family as a group. This
task requires supporting and enhancing the relationship between family
members as well as paying attention to issues that divide them. Illustrat-
ing the comparison between a lawyer for the family and lawyers for the
individuals underscores this point. It seems obvious that a negotiation
where each family member has her own lawyer would have a character
quite different than one where all the family members share one lawyer.
Third, the lawyer representing the family is likely to obtain more infor-
mation relevant to understanding the family than the lawyer would ob-
tain in representing individuals. A lawyer representing an individual
obtains information from that individual and from others at their suffer-
ance or in the course of adversary proceedings. In family representation,
the lawyer receives information from all family members and will there-
fore be able to learn more about the relationship between family mem-
bers than would a lawyer for an individual.332
C. Challenges to Optional Family Representation
This section considers arguments against permitting Optional Family
Representation and responds to them. Some of these challenges are theo-
retical ones which require theoretical responses. Other challenges raise
serious issues about the implementation of Optional Family Representa-
tion. Addressing these challenges requires the development of specific
procedures for implementing Optional Family Representation.
1. The Lawyer's Function is to Represent Individuals, Not Families
One could challenge Optional Family Representation on the grounds
that the primary function of lawyers under the legal ethics codes is to
330. One could argue that a broad definition of the individual's self-interest would
include the interest in harmony and family, as Professor Lloyd Weinreb suggested at the
Fordham Scholarship Colloquium; however, lawyers often view zealous representation as
requiring primary attention to maximizing the individual client's material well being.
Moreover, the focus on disharmonies between individuals which the established doctrine
requires for joint representation, see supra part I.A., indicates the legal profession's ten-
dency to view relationships through the lens of conflict, rather than cooperation. See
infra note 331.
331. Freedman, supra note 25, at 66. Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Prac-
tice of Law 43 (1978) ("conflict with everyone else is what the lawyer is retained to
handle").
332. These advantages are of course available when families qualify for joint represen-
tation or intermediation under established doctrine. Family representation makes these
advantages more widely available.
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represent individuals. 333 Lawyers seek to maximize their client's individ-
ual interests. The ethical codes permit joint representation of individuals
only where the lawyer can maximize, and not compromise, those individ-
ual interests.334 Representing a family, however, would require a lawyer
to mediate among a number of individual interests, none of which, in this
view, would receive optimal representation. Mediation is not the ethical
norm for a lawyer's conduct.3 35 Intermediation between clients is appro-
priate only under the limited circumstances prescribed by Rule 2.2 where
the sufficient commonality of individual interest and circumstance, sug-
gest little risk of harm to any individual's interests.
While it is true that the language of legal ethics focuses on individual
representation, legal ethics also permits representation of groups.336
Rule 1.13 provides for representation of both corporations and unincor-
porated associations. 337 Rule 1.13 is not limited to large groups. For
example, it could include a corporation with only two shareholders.
Similarly, Rule 1.13 is not limited to formal organizations. A voluntary
group of persons, such as a tenants' association, may seek representation
as a group. 338 Not only is group representation permitted, but despite
the largely individualistic language of the legal ethics codes group repre-
sentation is common.339
Given that under the terms of legal ethics and practice of the legal
profession, individuals are generally able to form groups for purposes of
legal representation, family members should have the same opportunity.
Preventing a group of family members from obtaining an option available
to other groups of individuals requires specific justification. Potential
justifications for such disparate treatment are discussed below.
2. In Contrast to Other Groups, Families Lack Identifiable Group
Characteristics Necessary to Legal Representation
One could argue that group representation is appropriate only for or-
ganizations with formal hierarchies that make it possible for the lawyer
to determine which organizational representatives have authority to
speak, or exchange information, on behalf of the entity. A corporation
has a charter and bylaws and a partnership has an agreement.3 40 A cor-
poration further has officers and directors. Indeed, much of Rule 1.13
uses the language of corporate structure to discuss a lawyer's duties to an
organization.34'
333. See supra part II.
334. See supra part I.A.
335. See supra note 331.
336. See Leubsdorf, supra note 163, at 825.
337. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13.
338. See Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1123; see supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
339. See Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1105; Leubsdorf, supra note 163, at 825.
340. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-
361 (July 12, 1991) (finding a partnership to be an entity under Rule 1.13).
341. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13.
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As discussed above, however, Rule 1.13 expressly applies to unincor-
porated associations, including "even a small group informally organized
for a limited purpose, ' '342 such as a group of homeownersM 3 or a tenants'
association.3 " Although a group's formality, "duration," and "elaborate
... purposes" are relevant to determining whether it is an organization
for purposes of Rule 1.13, the test of whether a group qualifies for repre-
sentation is whether the group identity "is distinct from its individual
constituents. 345 Families will often have identities "distinct from [their]
individual constituents., 346 Even with regard to the non-dispositive, but
persuasive, characteristics listed above, families will often be of long du-
ration, formally organized under legal or religious rules regarding mar-
riage and family, and quite elaborate in shared purposes.
One could further argue, however, that modem families are so varied
and fluid that they are not susceptible to identification as a distinct
group.34 7 The variation of modem families, for example, includes heter-
osexual marriages with or without children, single parent families, mul-
tigenerational families, and lesbian and gay families. 348 The fluidity of
families raises questions of whether, for purposes of legal representation,
they would include parents only, their children together, children from
previous relationships, previous spouses or partners, or grandparents.
If legal ethics sought to define the family for purposes of legal repre-
sentation, the variation and fluidity of the family might make family rep-
resentation problematic. The solution to this dilemma, however, is to
treat family groups like other groups. Family members, like members of
other groups, will define the identity of their group for purposes of the
representation. Family relationships outside the group will of course re-
main relevant to understanding the situation of the represented group of
family members. That does not make families different from all other
groups eligible for group representation. For example, a lawyer who rep-
resents a tenant group that is less than all of the tenants in a building will
have to deal with the existence of non-represented tenants in providing
representation to the tenant group. Similarly, separate lawyers could
represent general partners and limited partners.
Where family members choose group representation, questions may
still arise regarding whether group identity is indeed distinct from indi-
vidual interests. This problem is not limited to family representation. It
would seem to arise for all small groups. In close corporations, for exam-
342. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.13:103.
343. See id. § 1.13:204.
344. See Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1123.
345. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 27, § 1.13:103.
346. Id.
347. See Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, in
Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1453 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Collett, Intergenerational Representation].
348. See, eg., Franklin, supra note 12, at 1030 (describing various modem family
units).
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ple, the differing interests of the entity's constituents may make it impos-
sible to identify a group or corporate interest.349
In Optional Family Representation, as indeed all group representa-
tions, the lawyer must therefore ensure that a distinct group identity ex-
ists. For example, family members who do not indicate at the start of
representation that they seek a common or mutually acceptable resolu-
tion of their legal issues should not obtain group representation. Simi-
larly, family members who initially shared a common purpose may later
deadlock over specific plans.
Even where a distinct group identity exists for the family, one could
argue that modem families, as opposed to traditional patriarchal families
or corporations and partnerships, fail to offer procedures for communi-
cating information and making decisions necessary to group representa-
tion.35 Again, this problem is not limited to family groups. For
example, a group of tenants who organize for the purpose of a rent strike
is unlikely to have previously established organizational rules, such as
by-laws. Similarly, a partnership may exist without the benefit of a writ-
ten agreement. Even in representation of publicly-owned corporations,
situations may arise where the lawyer finds it difficult to ascertain the
corporation's will.35 The solution to this problem is to require that all
groups and entities, including family groups, specify in the retainer
agreement 352 the procedures for communicating with the lawyer and
making decisions.
Where the existence of a group is clear, confusion may still continue
regarding whether the lawyer represents the individual group members
as well as the group. Commentators have noted that such confusion oc-
curs frequently in the representation of close corporations.353 Accord-
349. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward A Realistic Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466, 477-481 (1989); Note, An Expectations
Approach to Client Identity, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 687-88 (1993).
350. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband
and Wife, 1994 Tractman Lecture, at 24 ) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (criti-
cizing earlier draft of this Article).
351. See Hazard & Koniak, supra note 48, at 764-65; Kenneth Kipnis, Legal Ethics
60-62 (1986). Some commentators have even suggested that publicly-owned corpora-
tions, the paradigm of group representation may lack a single, readily identifiable group
identity. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1426 (1989) (questioning the "personhood" of a corporation due
to "disparate independent actors"); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory
of the Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1764 (1989) (stating that "the firm is not an
individual").
352. Changes during the course of representation would result in changes in the re-
tainer agreement.
353. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 349, at 476 (discussing the unique nature of close
corporations); Note, supra note 349, at 687 (stating that the distinction between entity
and individual is blurred in closely-held corporations); cf Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's
Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Ex-
penditures, 32 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 587, 625-28 (1991) (discussing analogous question of
when a corporation speaks in the context of corporate political expenditures, for whom
does it speak).
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ingly, although the established doctrine generally permits continued
representation of an entity after a constituent's withdrawal, courts and
commentators have forbidden continued representation of a close corpo-
ration without consent of the departing constituent where the distinction
between corporate entity and shareholders blur.354
The same blurring of group and individual is likely to occur in other
small groups, such as a family. As a result of this common misunder-
standing, group members are likely to perceive a lawyer as disloyal for
continuing representation of adverse group members after the individ-
ual's withdrawal and absent the individual's consent. To protect confi-
dence in the legal system, and recognizing the inevitability of some
degree of blurred identity in small groups, small group representation
should treat withdrawal of an individual group member as the with-
drawal of an individual from joint representation and require consent to
continued representation of other group members who have a materially
adverse interest in the same or substantially related matter.355
3. Family Representation Will Result in the Lawyer Substituting Her
Judgment for that of the Family
Some have suggested that representation of the family group will result
in the lawyer substituting her judgment for that of the family and its
members.356 Professors Hazard and Koniak have observed a similar
danger in corporate representation. They suggest that lawyers for corpo-
rations tend to either treat the organization's constituents as the actual
clients or act "as lawyer 'for the situation,' empowered to act to further
the best interests of all concerned as the lawyer perceives those inter-
ests."'357 As "lawyer for the situation," the lawyer would "ultimately
decid[e] on the legal course that best serves the corporation. ' 358 Profes-
sors Hazard and Koniak observe that "[t]his approach, if taken to its
conclusion, divests management of control of the corporation's legal ac-
tions and places enormous power in the hands of 'disinterested'
lawyers. 359
Representing families as a unit presents the same danger. The broad,
unbounded, discretion afforded under Shaffer's proposal of representing
the family "paternalistically" and the Real Property Section's discretion-
ary Recommendations permit lawyers to substitute their judgment for
that of family members. Representing a family as an organization, with-
out limits or without clear direction from the family as client, would offer
354. See Mitchell, supra note 349, at 477-78; Note, supra note 349, at 687; see also
Wolfram, supra note 24, § 8.3.2 at 422.
355. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.9.
356. See Collett, Intergenerational Representation, supra note 347 at 1495.
357. Hazard & Koniak, supra note 48, at 764.
358. Id. at 764-65.
359. Id. at 765. Cf Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at 784 ("The label 'lawyer for the
situation' is too nebulous to adequately communicate to the potential clients the manner
in which the lawyer is going to represent their interests.").
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the confusion between constituent and "situation" representation that
Hazard and Koniak describe.36°
This problem underscores the need, even beyond family representa-
tion, for the requirement, discussed above, that the retainer specify how
the group members communicate with the lawyer and make decisions.
With these provisions, the lawyer would have an obligation to follow
their terms and seek the family's guidance on issues rather than substi-
tute her judgment. Family representation would then offer the opportu-
nity for the lawyer to seek to reconcile the interests of family members
without displacing the authority of the family unit. While this proposal
would not prevent lawyer manipulation of clients altogether, it would
make it more difficult and would limit it to the extent possible in any
legal representation.361
4. Power Imbalances Within the Family Make Family
Representation Inappropriate
Many commentators have observed that power imbalances exist within
the family generally to the detriment of women, or to the elderly in mul-
tigenerational families. One could argue that family representation will
perpetuate these imbalances and lead to results unfair to less powerful
family members. 36 2 In contrast, the argument goes, by requiring sepa-
360. See Hazard & Koniak, supra note 48, at 764-65.
361. Even where the clients' interests are readily identifiable, the problem of lawyer
manipulation of clients remains. One commentator has identified the danger that the
lawyer will "persuad[e] the family to adopt the lawyer's sense of fairness under the cir-
cumstances." Le Van, supra note 167, at 20. This latter problem of the individual lawyer
imposing her values on the family is unfortunately one which this Article's proposal will
not by itself address. Neither will the proposal increase its occurrence. As noted above,
this difficulty exists in representing families under the present rules. Moreover, empirical
studies suggest that "lawyers manipulate clients to achieve the lawyers' financial and
professional interests" except perhaps in corporate practice. Russell G. Pearce, Redis-
covering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 278
n.291 (1992). See, e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game: Organizational Coaptation of a Profession, Law & Soc'y Rev., June 1967, at 15,
22-31 (criminal defense practice); Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Ob-
servations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Of-
fice, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 177 (1986) (bankruptcy practice); Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer
and Client: Who's in Charge? (1974) (personal injury practice); Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Inter-
action, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737 (1988) (divorce representation). For corporate practice,
compare Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 504-05 (1985)
(lawyers follow the dictates of corporate clients even where they conflict with the lawyer's
personal ethics) with Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659 (1990)
(suggesting lawyers mislead corporate clients regarding billing and services). Accord-
ingly, all lawyers need to consider how to serve better the interests of clients, and not of
themselves.
362. In the context of family law, for example, Professor Janet Dolgin has cautioned
that communitarian perspectives on the family have historically "been used as an argu-
ment in support of oppression; and nowhere, perhaps, to more destructive effect than
against women, especially in their aspect as mothers." Dolgin, supra note 135, at 112.
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rate representation of family members where their interests diverge, or
are at risk, established doctrine protects less powerful family members
from exploitation.
While theoretically any individual might have more power within a
family, commentators have suggested that men generally have more
power than women. 63 Studies suggest that men generally have tangible
advantages, such as higher income and educational levels, and intangible
advantages, such as higher self-esteem, status, and aspirations. 36
Even were power between spouses equal, some commentators suggest
that men are more individualistic and women more communitarian in
their perspectives.3 65 To the extent this observation is accurate, female
family members may be more likely to defer to male family members 3 "6
and male family members are more likely to seek dominance.367
In light of these considerations, some commentators have challenged
assertions that the contextual and communal process of mediation,
rather than the formal and adversarial process of litigation, better fits the
familial aspects of a divorce. 368 These critics argue that imbalances be-
tween husband and wife will cause a neutral mediation to favor the hus-
band.3 69 A mediator could achieve fairness only by interfering with the
substance of the result, contrary to mediation's goals of neutrality and
party empowerment. 370 These commentators suggest that having a sepa-
rate lawyer protects the wife far better than a mediator would. 7
Similar arguments could be made regarding the role of the elderly in a
multigenerational family. A commentator has suggested, for example,
that comparable to the women's perspective mentioned above, elderly
persons place a higher priority on "harmoniz[ing] family relation-
ships.1372 Likewise, commentators have suggested factors which would
make elderly persons less powerful within a multi-generational family.
They may be dependent on the younger generation for "love and sup-
port. ' 373 They may also suffer from "the loss of physical and mental
capacities., 3
74
363. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 135, at 104; Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and
the Family 4 (1989).
364. See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441, 449-81 (1992).
365. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, A Different Voice (1982); Robin West, Feminism. Criti-
cal Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 59, 84.
366. See Trina Grllo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
Yale L.J. 1546, 1551 (1991).
367. See Bryan, supra note 364, at 463-65.
368. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 364, at 445; Grillo, supra note 366.
369. See Bryan, supra note 364, at 500, 509.
370. See Bryan, supra note 364, at 510-511.
371. See id at 519-23; Grllo, supra note 366 at 1597-1600.
372. Collett, Intergenerational Representation, supra note 347, at 1463 (citing as an
example Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 983 (Kan. App. 1993)).
373. Jay J. Sangerman, Ethical Issues in Elder Law, N.Y. St. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at
35.
374. Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to the
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It could be argued that these power imbalances and the resulting po-
tential for unfair treatment of less powerful persons justifies established
doctrine's balance in favor of the individual within the family.3" Estab-
lished doctrine requires the lawyer to focus on actual and potential dis-
harmonies and forbids joint representation of family members where the
representation poses a threat to the interests of one of the individuals.37 6
Undermining this justification for different treatment of family repre-
sentation is the continued domination of less powerful family members
under established doctrine. For example, one report on estate planning
found that the attorney's contact with the family is through the husband
and "[i]t is not uncommon for the attorney never to speak to the
wife."' 377 Similarly, another commentator has suggested that "[w]hat
often passes for family lawyering involves.., implementing the wishes of
the dominant family member. 378
One possible explanation for this situation is the failure of many law-
yers to follow established doctrine in representing families.3 79 Even were
they following established doctrine, however, its impact would be lim-
ited. As Professor Stephen Ellmann has observed in the context of mar-
riage, the reality of families is that family members participate in "a vast
range of joint decisionmaking, the fairness of which will be essentially
unreviewable by any third party. '380 If power imbalances persist within
a family, even where each family member has separate representation,
the family relationship will dictate the result of a legal transaction. At
best, separate representation will provide individual family members with
counsel's advice regarding the efficacy of alternative choices.
Optional Family Representation could provide the same advantage by
requiring that counsel provide the same type of information to each indi-
vidual family member. At each stage of the representation the lawyer
should advise each family member of the advantages and disadvantages
of family representation and of all other decisions for that individual.
The lawyer's duty to provide the individual family member with all infor-
mation relevant to the member's individual and group interests and pro-
hibits a duty of confidentiality to any individual family member with
regard to information relevant to another.38' In contrast, the weight of
authority under established doctrine appears to favor a duty of confiden-
tialtiy to each individual client in joint representation.382
Law, 42 Hastings L.J. 683, 697 (1991). See also Marshall B. Kapp, Representing Older
Persons: Ethical Challenges, Fla. B.J., June 1989, at 25, 25 ("[t]he elderly are more likely
to suffer from chronic physical and/or mental impairment").
375. See supra part II.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 38-48.
377. Developments, supra note 81, at 10.
378. Le Van, supra note 167, at 20.
379. See Moore & Pennell, supra note 233, at 12-03.
380. Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1125.
381. See supra note 113.
382. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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This approach has the unavoidable disadvantages of discouraging indi-
viduals from disclosing to lawyers information they do not want other
family members to know or placing the lawyer in the uncomfortable po-
sition of having to reveal embarrassing information where an inadvertent
disclosure occurs. Unfortunately, however, protecting sensitive informa-
tion from disclosure is incompatible with providing relevant information
to the other family members. Moreover, the individual hoping to keep
information confidential might refuse to join, or withdraw from, family
representation. When the individual inadvertently reveals embarrassing
information relevant to another family member, the lawyer either causes
harm to one family member by disclosing or to another by failing to
disclose. The need for disclosure, combined with the family member's
consent to disclosure as a condition of family representation, makes dis-
closure the fairer alternative.38 3
In addition to precluding a duty of confidentiality to individuals, the
lawyer's duty to provide advice and information to individual family
members also precludes a duty of confidentiality to the family entity, as is
the established approach for group representation under Rule 1.13.1"
Unlike publicly owned corporations, small groups, such as families or
close corporations, require that each group member have relevant infor-
mation to maintain continued group identity and decisionmaking abili-
ties. In a somewhat analogous context, the ABA Committee on
Professional Responsibility has recently opined that "information re-
ceived by a lawyer in the course of representing the partnership is 'infor-
mation relating to the representation' of the partnership, and normally
may not be withheld from individual partners. 315
By providing family members with relevant disclosures any time the
interests of an individual member might differ from that of the family
unit or of other family members, Optional Family Representation will
approximate the protections afforded under established doctrine.386
One could further argue for denying group representation to family
members on the ground that they lack the substantive protections af-
forded by legal duties which constituents owe to entities such as corpora-
tions and partnerships. 7 Partners and corporate constituents, for
example, have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the entity,
even where these actions may conflict with their own self-interest.388
383. Of course, the lawyer should seek to persuade the family member who has re-
vealed the embarrassing information to disclose it to the other family member. However,
in light of the lawyer's duty to reveal the information if the family member does not, the
lawyer's "persuasion" will be somewhat coercive.
384. See Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 1.13.
385. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 361 (1991).
386. See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text; cf. Dzienkowski, supra note 5, at
792 (suggesting a similar approach to representation under Rule 2.2).
387. Cf Collett, Intergenerational Representation, supra note 347, at 1484.
388. See, ag., William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corpo-
rations 471-548 (duty of care), 556-94 (duty of loyalty) (6th ed. 1988); Harold G. Reus-
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These duties include disclosure of all relevant information and substan-
tive fairness in dealings with the entity.38 9
Significant fiduciary duties, however, do exist within the family.
Courts have required good faith and fair dealing within families under
the confidential relationship doctrine and imposed constructive trusts
where the confidential relationship has been abused. 9 0 In the context of
post-marital agreements, for example, fiduciary duties require spouses to
disclose all relevant "financial and non-financial information," to refrain
from exercising "undue influence," and to avoid contract terms that are,
depending on the jurisdiction, either unreasonable or unconscionable. 391
These fiduciary duties do not arise in all family relationships. While
some commentators suggest that a confidential relationship exists for all
spousal relationships,392 others suggest a family relationship is not suffi-
cient to establish a confidential relationship.393 Some require, in addi-
tion, "the actual placing of trust and confidence. '3 94  Others further
require a significant "disparity of position," such as where the "benefici-
ary of the confidential relation is in a weak position because of advanced
age, or youth, or lack of education, or ill health, or mental weakness" or
subordinate status.395
Although generally not as pervasive as fiduciary duties owed corpora-
chlein & William A. Gregory, Handbook on the Law of Agency and Partnership § 188
(1979); Henry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises § 235 (3d ed. 1983). In Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928),
Justice Cardozo provided what has become the classic description of fiduciary obligation
as "the duty of the finest loyalty .... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive." Id. at 546.
389. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13 (1958) (summarizing duties agent
owes to the principal); id. §§ 387-431 (discussing the agent's fiduciary duties); Uniform
Partnership Act § 20 ("Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all
things affecting the partnership to any partner .... ); Harry G. Henn, Handbook of the
Law of Corporations § 218 (2d ed., 1970) ("[D]irectors ... are subject to duties (a) to act
intra vires and within their respective authority, (b) to exercise due care, and (c) to ob-
serve applicable fiduciary duties." (footnotes omitted); id. § 235 (listing fiduciary duties);
William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors
§§ 3.01-.03 (4th ed., 1988) (describing the duties of corporate directors and officers re-
garding loyalty to their corporation, conflicts of interest in transactions of their corpora-
tion, and disclosure of all material facts germane to corporate transactions); Reed
Rowley, Rowley on Partnership § 20.0 (2d ed., 1960) ("[T]he duty [to disclose] extends
beyond [§ 20 of the Uniform Partnership Act] . . . and there is an additional duty to
reveal information unknown or inaccessible to a copartner.").
390. See George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and
Trustees § 482 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
391. Louis I. Parley, Post-Marital Agreements, J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 125, 129-
32 (1992).
392. See id.
393. See Bogert & Bogert, supra note 390, § 482; see, e.g., United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) ("marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary
relationship").
394. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 390, § 482.
395. Id.
REPRESENTING SPOUSES
tions and partnerships, 9 6 family fiduciary duties do offer weaker family
members some protection from more powerful ones. Indeed, the fiduci-
ary duties in family relationships provide greater protection from power
imbalances than in some other groups, such as tenant associations.397
The existence of family fiduciary duties, and the absence of duties for
some groups qualifying for group representation, undermines the argu-
ment for a special exclusion of families from group representation.
This discussion of power imbalances, however, suggests that changes
in the lawyer's duties along the lines of enforcing minimal fiduciary du-
ties would enhance representation of families and other small groups and
avoid legal representation becoming a vehicle for exploitation of some
group members. The role of the lawyer would be to protect a minimum
level of fairness in group process.398 The lawyer must have a reasonable
belief that family members in good faith share common family pur-
poses.399 The lawyer must also ensure that group decisions are made by
396. For example, family duties are owed to other family members, rather than the
entity. Compare id. (discussing fiduciary and confidential relationships within the family)
with Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law § 4.1 ("Directors... owe their corporations ... a
fiduciary duty of loyalty."). In this regard, families are similar to partnerships where the
partners' obligations run to each other. See e.g., Rowley, supra note 389, § 20.0 (discuss-
ing copartners obligations). Regarding protection of less powerful family members, how-
ever, a duty to individual family members may actually be more protective than one to
the organization. In addition, instead of arising automatically from group membership,
the duties derive from a confidential relationship related to a particular transaction.
Compare Bogert & Bogert, supra note 390, § 482 (family) with supra note 389. Therefore,
family fiduciary obligations might fail to arise either generally or for the particular rela-
tionship which occurs during the legal representation.
397. Cf. Comment, The Confidential Relationship Theory of Constructive Trust: An
Exception to the Statue of Frauds, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 561, 564 (1961) ("In a majority of
cases wherein a confidential relationship has been found, a family relationship has also
existed between grantor and grantee.") (footnote omitted).
398. The lawyer's process protecting role is somewhat akin to the role that political
theorists, such as John Hart Ely, have suggested for the courts within our system of
government. See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980); James G. Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging
Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 Ore. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1989). Ely, for example, argues for the
paradoxical role of unelected courts in protecting representative democracy. See, e.g.,
Ely, supra, at 102-04. In a similarly paradoxical role, under Optional Family Representa-
tion the lawyer paternalistically interferes with group process to ensure the conditions
necessary for the individual group members and the group itself to assert their autonomy.
See generally Ellmann, supra note 97. Some might argue that such a paternalistic role is
inconsistent with the lawyer's duties. But see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Re-
publican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 241 (1992) (con-
trary to prevailing assumption that "the legal ethics codes embody an adversarial ethic,"
they provide lawyers with broad discretion to further the common good). It is, however,
less paternalistic than the lawyer's response to conflicts in joint representation under the
established doctrine. The legal ethics rules currently require the lawyer paternalistically
to refuse representation entirely where the lawyer has made an objective determination
that risks exist, despite the express wish of client family members. See supra part I. In
contrast, Optional Family Representation permits representation in such circumstances,
see supra notes 322-27, subject to the limitations in part V.D. infra.
399. See supra note 353 and accompanying text; cf Batt, supra note 17, at 341 (urging
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individuals who are aware of all relevant information. 4°° The lawyer
must reasonably believe that family members are dealing fairly with each
other and are disclosing relevant financial and nonfinancial information.
The lawyer must advise each family group member regarding the sub-
stantive fairness to the individual, as well as the group, of various alter-
natives." 1 The lawyer must also reasonably believe that group members
have had an equal opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking
process.
The lawyer must be careful, however, to avoid using these duties as an
excuse to substitute her judgment for that of the group.40 2 As Professor
Stephen Ellmann cautions, "the lawyer should consider herself responsi-
ble for assuring a baseline of democratic and participative process within
the group, but beyond this baseline she generally should not override
arrangements evolved by the group itself."'40 3 Similarly, while the lawyer
must advise each individual family member regarding the fairness to that
individual of possible decisions, the lawyer should not interfere with the
substance of decisions the group makes. 4"
D. Modifying the Rules to Permit Optional Family Representation
The Model Rules could implement Optional Family Representation
through changes either to Rule 2.2 40 generally or to Rule 1.13 specifi-
cally for representation of small groups, including close corporations.
First, the rules should require that members of small groups, such as
families, identify both in form and in purpose of representation the iden-
tity of the group and its procedures for communicating information and
making decisions."0 6 The rules should further require that the lawyer
reasonably believe at the initiation and throughout the representation
that a bona fide group identity exists and that group members are dealing
fairly with each other and disclosing all relevant information.4 °7
Although similar to Rule 2.2's requirement that the lawyer reasonably
believe "that each client will be able to make adequately informed deci-
that entity representation of families not be permitted where some family members "are
attempting to gain an advantage over one another").
400. For a more extensive discussion of confidentiality issues, see supra, notes 384-91
and accompanying text.
401. This is precisely the type of information commentators suggest would be neces-
sary to address power imbalances in divorce mediations. See supra note 373.
402. See supra part V.C.3.
403. Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1145. Professor Ellmann's understanding of the law-
yer's role in protecting process is more limited than that of Optional Family Representa-
tion. See infra note 431.
404. See infra part V.E.2.
405. See Batt, supra note 17, at 339-41; Pennell, Professional Responsibility, supra note
186, 18-51 to 18-52. But see Collett, And the Two, supra note 10, at 117-18 (arguing
Rule 2.2 not appropriate for family representation because of its focus on financial
relationships).
406. See supra part V.C.2.
407. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 381-401.
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sions in the matter,""° these provisions would revise both Rules 1.13
and 2.2.
Second, the rules should require the lawyer to inform members of
small groups, such as families, of the advantages and disadvantages of
group representation and of the availability of separate representation or
representation under Rule 1.7. The lawyer should make these disclo-
sures and obtain each individual's consent to representation, at the initia-
tion of the representation, at every point where these considerations are
relevant to group deeisions and at times when new advantages and disad-
vantages arise.' This analysis of advantages and disadvantages will of
course, include a substantive evaluation of how alternatives affect indi-
vidual group members. Such disclosures are similar to the disclosures
currently required under Rule 2.2, but would be new to Rule 1.13.
Third, to facilitate such disclosures, the rules must preclude any duty
of confidentiality to individual group members or the group entity.41
The preclusion of confidentiality to an individual would clarify a lawyer's
duties under Rule 2.2,411' but would be unnecessary under Rule 1.13
which currently does not provide any duty of confidentiality to an orga-
nizational constituent. The preclusion of confidentiality to an entity
would be contrary to the existing provisions of Rule 1.13 and new to
Rule 2.2.
Fourth, as a number of authorities have suggested for partnerships and
close corporations, 412 the lawyer's representation should be deemed to
apply to group members in their individual capacity as well as their
group affiliation for purposes of subsequent representation. Accordingly,
if group members withdraw from the group, the remaining members
would require their consent to representation by the same lawyer in the
"the same or substantially related matter" where the group's interests
"are materially adverse to the interests of the former" group member.4"'
With these changes, a specific rule for family representation" 4 is un-
necessary. As noted above, problems in defining and communicating
with the client, and in avoiding unfair treatment of individual members
of a group, occur generally in small groups, including those with corpo-
rate or partnership structures.415 Accordingly, changes to the Rules to
accommodate Optional Family Representation should apply to all small
408. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule 2.2(a)(2).
409. This provision is much more favorable to constituents than Rule 1.13 which re-
quires disclosure that the lawyer represents the organization only when the organization's
interests "are adverse" to those of the constituent. Model Rules, supra note 23, Rule
1.13(d).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 381-85.
411. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
413. See supra text accompanying note 355.
414. For example, some participants at the conference proposed a rule specifically for
family representation. See Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, Working Group
Report on Intergenerational Conflicts, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1037 (1994).
415. See supra text accompanying notes 340-54.
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groups. This approach offers the further benefit of avoiding debate re-
garding the definition of family416 and of permitting family members, like
other group members, to determine for themselves whether or not they
constitute a group for purposes of legal representation.
E. Applying Optional Family Representation
To illustrate the operation of Optional Family Representation, this
section will apply it to the Estate and Nursing Home Hypotheticals used
in this Article, as well as to two multigenerational hypotheticals, one of
which is an extension of the Nursing Home Hypothetical.
1. Estate Hypothetical
In the Estate Hypothetical, Optional Family Representation would re-
quire disclosures similar to established doctrine before initiating repre-
sentation.417 One additional disclosure required under Optional Family
Representation is the lack of confidentiality for disclosures relevant to
the other family member. Under established doctrine, disclosure regard-
ing loss of the attorney-client privilege in subsequent litigation between
John and Mary is necessary, but disclosure regarding confidentiality de-
pends on whether the jurisdiction recognizes a duty of confidentiality to
individuals in a joint representation.41 8
After discussion of the advantages and disadvantages with the client,
under Optional Family Representation, Ms. Lawyer would have to deter-
mine whether she reasonably believes that John and Mary share a com-
mon group purpose in obtaining the representation. If she makes this
determination, she may accept the representation, even if facts exist sug-
gesting a risk to either John or Mary that would make representation
unacceptable under established doctrine.4 19
Optional Family Representation also provides both similar and differ-
ent responses to Mary's subsequent disclosure to Ms. Lawyer that she
desires a new will to be kept secret from John. Established doctrine
would permit Ms. Lawyer to urge Mary to share this information with
John, but would not require her to do so.420 It would require Ms. Law-
yer to withdraw from representation if Mary refuses to share the infor-
mation with John. Depending on the jurisdiction's rule, Ms. Lawyer
would also have to maintain Mary's confidentiality.42' Even if Mary
made the disclosure, Ms. Lawyer would have to obtain informed consent
to continuing the representation and would have to withdraw if a reason-
able lawyer would find that continued representation would adversely
416. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 12.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 398-404.
418. For a discussion of the confusion regarding this issue, see supra note 48.
419. See supra part I.C.l.
420. See id.
421. See supra note 48.
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affect the representation. 422 Upon withdrawal, she could represent either
spouse individually only with the consent of the other.42
In Optional Family Representation, Mary would have been on notice
from the start of representation that Ms. Lawyer had no duty of confi-
dentiality to her. 24 While this makes it less likely that she would have
confidentially disclosed to Ms. Lawyer her desire to obtain a secret will,
it makes it more likely that in deciding whether to enter family represen-
tation, she would have raised the concerns underlying this desire and
might even have discussed them with John and the lawyer. If Mary in-
advertently discloses this desire, which is certainly relevant to John's es-
tate planning interests, Ms. Lawyer must disclose this information to
John if Mary refuses to do so.425 Although Optional Family Representa-
tion would not require Ms. Lawyer to urge Mary to make the disclosure,
Ms. Lawyer's obligation to the family's harmonies, as well as its dishar-
monies, and her obligation to promote the sharing of information within
the family,4 26 would make her more likely to urge Mary to make disclo-
sure. Mary, faced with the fact that disclosure would be made no matter
what she decided, would of course be more likely to disclose. If Mary
refused to disclose, Ms. Lawyer would have to withdraw from represen-
tation of the family after making the disclosure and, as under established
doctrine, could only represent John or Mary individually with the other's
consent.427
Even if Mary made the disclosure, Ms. Lawyer would have to obtain
informed consent to continue the representation, as in established doc-
trine. In addition, Ms. Lawyer would have to determine that the group
identity persisted.42 As with the initiation of the representation, if these
conditions were satisfied, Ms. Lawyer could continue the representation
even if a reasonable lawyer would have found that the continued repre-
sentation could adversely affect the interests of either individual.
2. Estate Hypothetical Revisited: The Patriarchal Family
Modifying the Estate Hypothetical to posit a patriarchal family further
illuminates Optional Family Representation. When John and Mary meet
with Ms. Lawyer, they explain that John as the husband is the head of
the family. Mary asks Ms. Lawyer to communicate only with John who
will make all decisions. This hypothetical appears to create a conflict
between the family members' determination of the procedures for com-
municating with the lawyer and the lawyer's role in protecting group
422. See supra part I.C. .
423. See id.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 406-11.
425. See id
426. See id.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 398-401, 406-13.
428. See id
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process.4 2 9 Under Optional Family Representation, however, the family
members cannot use their responsibility for establishing procedures for
consultation430 to modify the lawyer's duty to ensure that each family
member receives full information and a full opportunity to make deci-
sions.4 31 Accordingly, Ms. Lawyer cannot agree to communicate exclu-
sively with John. The family's procedures for communicating with the
lawyer must include advice to Mary, as well as her participation in group
decisions. On the other hand, in making decisions, Mary is free to decide
to defer to John.
3. Nursing Home Hypothetical
Established doctrine's focus on family disharmonies is likely to pro-
hibit Mr. Lawyer's representation of Ozzie and Harriet because of Oz-
zie's desire to institutionalize Harriet and her intent to resist
institutionalization.432 In contrast, if Ozzie and Harriet demonstrate a
commitment to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of their differ-
ences, Optional Family Representation would permit family representa-
tion upon informed consent and a determination of the existence of a
bona fide family group.43 3 If at some point it becomes clear that Ozzie
and Harriet cannot resolve their differences in a manner acceptable to
both, the lawyer must withdraw from family representation and may
only represent either spouse individually with the other's consent.434
4. Multigenerational Nursing Home Hypothetical
The analysis of the Nursing Home Hypothetical described above
would similarly apply if children Ricky and David join Ozzie and Har-
riet in seeking family representation.
Professor Teresa Stanton Collett has further raised the question as to
whether, under family representation, a majority vote of Ozzie, Ricky,
and David could force the institutionalization of Harriet over her objec-
tion.435 The answer to this question is clearly no. By participating in
family representation, Harriet does not give other family members con-
trol of decisions she is legally empowered to make.43 6 She need not com-
429. See supra notes 398-404, 406-11 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 398-404, 406-11 and accompanying text. Professor Ellmann's
concept of the lawyer's role in protecting process would not extend this far. He suggests
that it would be improper for the lawyer to insist on an equal vote for a wife who wishes
to delegate all decisions to her husband. Ellmann, supra note 97, at 1153 n. 131. Under
Optimal Family Representation, however, this interference in John and Mary's autonomy
is necessary to ensure a minimum level of fairness to individuals within the family. See
supra part V.C.4.
432. See supra part I.C.2.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 406-13.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 405-12.
435. See Collett, Intergenerational Representation, supra note 347, at 1484.
436. The family members would have to obtain appointment of a guardian, conserva-
tor, or committee to gain such control. See Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The
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ply with her family members' desire to institutionalize her. At all times,
moreover, she retains the right to withdraw from family representa-
tion.4 37 Were she not to withdraw formally, Mr. Lawyer would have to
terminate family representation if the family members deadlocked re-
garding the purpose of the representation.438
Alternatively, if Harriet decided voluntarily to follow the guidance of
the majority, despite her inclination to the contrary, Mr. Lawyer could
continue to represent the family if the family group continued to satisfy
the conditions for family representation. Additional issues which might
arise regarding Harriet's capacity439 are beyond the scope of this Article
which limits itself to issues arising in the representation of competent
family members. 440
5. Multigenerational Family Business Hypothetical
Harriet owns a restaurant business which her children Eddie and
Laura manage with her." Harriet, Eddie, and Laura consult Ms. Law-
yer for estate planning. As part of the representation, Harriet prepares a
will leaving her business equally to Eddie and Laura. Later, Harriet's
relationship with Laura cools and Harriet asks Ms. Lawyer to draft a
new will for her which leaves the business exclusively to Eddie. Aware of
the chill in her relationship with her mother, Laura asks Ms. Lawyer if
her mother is planning to draft a new will removing Laura's interest in
the business.
The results of this hypothetical are similar to the Estate Hypothetical,
including the conditions for initiating and continuing representation." 2
Here, under Optional Family Representation, Ms. Lawyer must inform
Laura and Eddie of Harriet's request if, after consultation, Harriet re-
fuses to do So.44 3 In contrast, under established doctrine, Ms. Lawyer
may have an obligation to keep the request confidential, but cannot lie to
Laura. 4 " If Harriet discloses her request, continued representation re-
quires satisfaction of the conditions of representation under either estab-
lished doctrine or Optional Family Representation." 5 If Harriet refuses
to disclose, under both established doctrine and Optional Family Repre-
sentation, Ms. Lawyer must withdraw from representation of the family
Law of Trusts § 7 (4th ed., 1987) (guardianship); Bogert & Bogert, supra note 391, § 13
(guardianship and conservatorship).
437. See supra text accompanying notes 398-404, 406-11.
438. See id
439. See Collett, Disclosure, supra note 48.
440. See supra note 18.
441. The names for this hypothetical are taken from my son Seth's favorite television
show Family Matters. The facts are very loosely based on Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d
634 (S.C. 1991).
442. See supra part V.E.I.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 398-404, 406-11.
444. See Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d at 637; supra text accompanying notes 114-21.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 33-48, 406-11.
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members."46 Similarly, under both Optional Family Representation and
established doctrine, after termination of joint or family representation,
representation of any of the family members in this matter would require
consent of the others." 7
CONCLUSION
Established legal ethics doctrine generally tends to restrict lawyers to
viewing families as collections of individuals, rather than family groups.
This approach is contrary to how many families view themselves and
how many family professionals view families. Modifications of the legal
ethics codes are therefore needed to permit lawyers to offer representa-
tion to families as communities, rather than a collection of individuals.
In contrast to other alternatives, this Article's proposal for Optional
Family Representation would allow families, and not lawyers, to choose
whether their representation should be as a family or as a collection of
individuals. At the same time, it would avoid unfairness to individual
family members by requiring the existence of a bona fide family group
and continual disclosure of relevant information to afford family mem-
bers the opportunity to withdraw if they so choose.
These changes alone will not suffice to ensure that lawyers value fami-
lies and seek to use the law to reflect their truths. They would only make
it both permissible and easier for lawyers to do so. To understand fami-
lies better, lawyers will have to learn from experts in other fields, such as
family therapy. Just as a lawyer representing a business needs to under-
stand balance sheets and business practices," 8 a lawyer representing a
family needs to understand family processes.449 How lawyers should
seek and apply this knowledge are questions for another day.
446. See id.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96, 409-11.
448. See Mary C. Daly, Competence and Confidentiality: Understanding Financial
Statements-Understanding Lawyers' Professional Responsibilities, in Accounting for
Lawyers 1993, at 431, 433 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course handbook Series no. 830,
1993) ("[tjhe lawyer who fails to understand financial statements runs the risk of both
disciplinary sanctions and malpractice liability.").
449. See, e.g., Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of
Assets for Elder Clients: A Context, Role, and Law Approach, in Ethical Issues in Repre-
senting Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1411 (1994) (incorporating insights from mul-
tisystems therapy into analysis of lawyer's role in representing elderly clients); Le Van,
supra note 166, at 21-22 (discussing lessons from family therapy for family representa-
tion); Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 481 (1992) (including perspective
of family therapists in discussions of how lawyers should treat family secrets).
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